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While Americans remain confident in law enforcement, there are profound 
fractures in the relationship between the police and certain communities across the 
United States. Law enforcement shootings of unarmed individuals—particularly 
African Americans—inadequate police response, and the subsequent civil unrest raise 
disturbing and often volatile concerns for public safety. This thesis asserts that, as an 
industry, law enforcement is experiencing a nationwide crisis. Although law 
enforcement has been unable to successfully navigate the dynamics of reputation 
management during a crisis, companies in the private sector have identified effective 
frameworks, paradigms, and best practices for successfully regaining—and, more 
importantly, maintaining—the public’s trust. 
Consequently, this paper seeks to determine how law enforcement can apply crisis 
and reputation management techniques developed by the private sector to effectively 
regain the trust of the American public. The thesis provides law enforcement executives 
with an opportunity to learn from the private sector and put the most critical lessons 
learned in crisis and reputation management into practice. 
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While public polls indicate over half of Americans remain confident in law 
enforcement, there are profound fractures in the relationship between the police and 
certain communities across the United States.1 In recent years, law enforcement crises 
such as police shootings of unarmed individuals, incidents of officer misconduct, and 
widespread protests and riots have demonstrated that the relationship between the public 
and law enforcement is becoming increasingly strained. These crises have eroded the 
public’s trust, and have negatively impacted law enforcement’s legitimacy and ability to 
effectively police communities.  
This thesis asserts that law enforcement fails to implement effective crisis and 
reputation management strategies in order to proactively address the complicated and 
evolving challenge of improving its relationship with the American public. It further 
contends that, in today’s technologically advanced and information-rich environment, a 
more modern approach to public trust building is necessary. Unfortunately, outside of 
tactical operations and emergency management, very little academic work has been 
dedicated to developing innovative and effective crisis and reputation management 
techniques in law enforcement.  
While law enforcement has not been able to fruitfully navigate the dynamics of 
trust and legitimacy with the public, companies in the private sector have identified 
effective frameworks, paradigms, and best practices for successfully regaining—and, 
more importantly, maintaining—the public’s trust. This thesis employs case study 
analysis of private-sector crises as an inquiry that empirically evaluates the contemporary 
public trust phenomenon within a real-world context. The case studies presented are 
particularly helpful for exploring research questions involving strategies, as “case study 
research has the ability to detail the exploratory and explanatory function of research,” 
and can be the basis of significant evaluative generalizations that can be applied to a 
                                                 




variety of disciplines, including law enforcement.2 Therefore, an in-depth analysis of 
each case identifies an effective strategy employed by the private-sector organization, and 
probes the accepted model or strategy vis-à-vis law enforcement. The strategies and 
accompanying case studies evaluated in this thesis are:  
1. Crisis communication via social media: BP oil spill, 
2. Transparency: Volkswagen diesel scandal, 
3. Organizational reform: Mattel toy recall crisis, and 
4. Shaping the narrative: Target data breach. 
The analysis of each case suggests that the issue of reputation is directly linked to 
an organization’s trustworthiness, perceived legitimacy, effectiveness, and more 
importantly, success. This assertion can be extrapolated to the law enforcement 
profession. According to the National Institute of Justice, a police force with a good 
reputation is not just simple rhetoric; a strong reputation creates a police–community 
partnership that enhances trust, equality, and public safety.3  
The concluding chapter of this thesis suggests that the crisis and reputation 
management strategies exploited by the private sector can be tailored to serve the needs 
of law enforcement, and can serve as a starting point for meaningful discourse for law 
enforcement executives. If the evidence is correct and reputation management, 
particularly during a crisis, is connected to an organization’s perceived trust and 
legitimacy, law enforcement can employ crisis and reputation management strategies to 
regain the American public’s trust.  
Ultimately, this work provides law enforcement executives with an opportunity to 
learn from the private sector, and put the most critical lessons learned in crisis and 
reputation management into practice. Through critical and realistic self-assessment, law 
enforcement executives have the chance to evaluate their strengths and vulnerabilities, 
                                                 
2 Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research, 5th ed. (London: SAGE, 2014), 7.  
3 Bertus R. Ferreira, “The Use and Effectiveness of Community Policing in a Democracy,” National 
Criminal Justice Reference Service, accessed October 20, 2017, www.ncjrs.gov/policing/use139.htm.  
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develop a new skillset of tactics designed to deliver proper response and effective 
containment of even the most unyielding crises, and address potential crises long before 
public anger boils over and erupts into civil disturbance.  
During an era when one officer-involved shooting has the capacity to disturb the 
smooth operations of an agency and permanently damage organizational reputation, law 
enforcement leaders should be prepared to successfully employ effective crisis and 
reputation–management strategies aimed at reestablishing public trust. The evidence 
presented nationwide indicates law enforcement crises have resulted in unprecedented 
problems that cannot be resolved with traditional strategies. New, innovative, and 
effectual crisis and reputation strategies, supported by academic rigor, could be the key to 
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While public polls indicate that over half of Americans remain confident in the 
institution of law enforcement, there are profound fractures in the relationship between 
the police and certain communities.1 In recent years, outspoken individuals, groups, and 
organizations, with the assistance of the media, have demonstrated that the relationship 
between the public and law enforcement is becoming increasingly negative.2 Many cities 
across the United States are currently experiencing large-scale demonstrations, protests, 
and in some cases riots over the public’s perception of police misconduct and use of 
force. At the 2016 International Association of Chiefs of Police Conference held in San 
Diego, California, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director James Comey asserted 
that this is a “uniquely difficult time in American law enforcement.”3 
The growing disenchantment with, and erosion of the public’s trust in, law 
enforcement is problematic because it directly impacts law enforcement’s legitimacy and 
ability to effectively police communities. A strong relationship built upon mutual trust 
between law enforcement organizations and the communities they serve is critical to 
maintaining public safety.4 It is therefore imperative that police departments actively 
address the complicated and evolving challenge of improving their relationship with the 
American public.  
According to a 2015 RAND report, many law enforcement executive managers 
have attempted to create public trust models and strategies to address the growing chasm 
                                                 
1 “U.S. Confidence In Police Recovers from Last Year’s Low,” Gallup, June 14, 2016, 
www.gallup.com/poll/192701/confidence-police-recovers-last-year-low.aspx?g_source=confidence%20 
police&g_medium=search&g_campaign=tiles.   
2 Curtis Skinner, “Wave of Anti-police Protests Strains U.S. Law Enforcement,” Reuters, July 7, 2016, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-police-protest-idUSKCN0ZN2OO.   
3 Mike Levine, “FBI Director Rejects Talk of Epidemic of Police Violence against Blacks,” ABC 
News, October 16, 2016, http://abcnews.go.com/US/fbi-director-comey-rejects-talk-epidemic-police-
violence/story?id=42846387.    
4 “Importance of Police-Community Relationships and Resources for Further Reading,” U.S. 
Department of Justice, accessed October 26, 2017, https://www.justice.gov/crs/file/836486/download.   
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between their organizations and communities across the nation.5 Although most 
strategies vary in name, objective, and implementation, their concepts all fall within the 
“community-oriented policing” framework.6  
Law enforcement agencies’ current practices, however, face limitations. First, not 
every police department across the nation has taken active measures to improve 
relationships with the communities they serve. For example, some executive managers 
argue that since the institution of law enforcement consistently ranks high in public 
confidence and trust, no major reform is required.7 Additionally, the community-oriented 
policing concept was conceived following the political unrest and widespread protests 
that plagued the 1960s.8 With society’s current technologically advanced and 
information-rich environment, a more modern approach to public trust-building is 
necessary.  
As noted in the aforementioned RAND report, while some agencies have 
efficaciously rebuilt community relationships, American law enforcement—as a larger 
institution—has not successfully repaired its relationship with the communities it serves.9 
This claim is substantiated by the increase in police protests across the nation, the 
escalation in assaults on officers, and the upsurge of vandalism on law enforcement 
buildings and equipment.10 From 1990–1999, there were eleven major protests across the 
nation, including the Rodney King–fueled protests in Los Angeles.11 From 2000–2009, 
                                                 
5 Brian A. Jackson, Respect And Legitimacy—A Two-Way Street: Strengthening Trust between Police 
and the Public in an Era of Increasing Transparency (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2015), 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE154.html.   
6 Charlotte Gill et al., “Community-Oriented Policing to Reduce Crime, Disorder and Fear and 
Increase Satisfaction and Legitimacy among Citizens: A Systematic Review,” Journal of Experimental 
Criminology 10, no. 4 (2014): 399–428, doi:10.1007/s11292-014-9210-y.  
7 Catherine Gallagher et al., The Public Image of the Police (Philadelphia: International Association of 
Chiefs of Police, 2001), http://www.iacp.org/The-Public-Image-of-the-Police.   
8 Kate Abbey-Lambertz and Joseph Erbentraut, “The Simple Strategies that Could Fundamentally 
Change How Communities View Their Police,” Huffington Post, last modified July 7, 2016, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/02/17/community-policing-police-trust_n_6607766.html.   
9 Jackson, Respect and Legitimacy.   
10 Ashley Fantz and Steve Visser, “Hundreds Arrested in Protests over Shootings by Police,” CNN, 
last modified August 4, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/10/us/black-lives-matter-protests/.   
11 Wikipedia, s.v. “List of Incidents of Civil Unrest in the United States,” accessed October 20, 2017, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_incidents_of_civil_unrest_in_the_United_States#1990.E2.80.931999.  
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that figure rose to sixteen incidents of civil unrest.12 However, between 2010 and the 
publishing of this thesis, thirty-six incidents of civil unrest have occurred across the 
nation, 44 percent of which resulted directly from officer-involved use-of-force 
incidents.13 Additionally, in 2001, there were 196 ambush attacks on officers.14 That 
figure rose to 206 in 2007, and spiked to 267 in 2012.15 Consequently, there is little 
empirical evidence to suggest current strategies are effectively improving the public’s 
trust and perceived legitimacy in law enforcement. 
While law enforcement has been unable to fruitfully navigate these dynamics, 
companies in the private sector have dedicated energy and resources to identify effective 
frameworks, paradigms, and best practices for successfully regaining, and more 
importantly maintaining, the public’s trust. The result of this effort is a series of 
reputation and crisis management techniques that have been extensively studied and 
exploited in the private sector. 
This thesis seeks to answer the following research question: Can law enforcement 
apply crisis and reputation management techniques developed by the private sector to 
regain the trust of the American public? In answering this question, the thesis identifies 
and analyzes the best techniques for crisis and reputation management in the private 
sector through case studies, and adapts components of public trust models that can be 
tailored to serve the needs of law enforcement agencies.  
A. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Almost no academic research exists in the study of improving the public’s trust in 
law enforcement vis-à-vis verified reputation and crisis management models. There are, 
however, a number of reputation and crisis management techniques for regaining the 
public’s trust researched and developed by the private sector. This literature review, 
                                                 
12 Wikipedia, s.v. “List of Incidents of Civil Unrest in the United States.”  
13 Ibid.  
14 International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), Community Oriented Policing Services, and 
CAN Analysis & solutions, Ambush Fact Sheet (Washington, DC: IACP, 2013), http://www.theiacp.org/ 
Portals/0/documents/pdfs/Ambush_Project/IACP_Ambush_Fact_Sheet.pdf.  
15 Ibid.  
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therefore, synthesizes some of the most relevant research and successful frameworks 
employed by the private sector to improve the trust and legitimacy of a company with the 
public, consumers, and their stakeholders. 
According to the literature, the volume of research on reputation management is 
developing and expanding in parallel to that of crisis management.16 The two disciplines 
are very much interrelated, and this thesis recognizes them as inherently associated with 
one another. The literature review is divided into three sections for analysis: crisis 
communication, transparency, and organizational reform. Within each section is an 
examination of the major schools of thought or strategies germane to reputation and crisis 
management.  
1. Crisis Communication 
Effective crisis communication is absolutely essential to any good crisis response 
strategy. There are three crisis communication stratagems an organization can employ, 
depending on the stage of the crisis: instructing information, adjusting information, and 
internalizing information.17 According to Coombs, these strategies will either 1) explain 
how a crisis will or might affect stakeholders, 2) update stakeholders and explain actions 
that the organization is taking to prevent similar recurrence, or 3) help an organization 
manage its reputation through the crisis.18 Nearly all of the literature reviewed suggests 
that an organization must match an appropriate crisis communication strategy to the 
specific crisis at hand in order to manage the organization’s reputation. 
This thesis also explores crisis communication using the Internet and social media 
as a platform for communication. Social media can either offer a unique opportunity for 
an organization in its efforts to manage a crisis, or can create substantial challenges. 
Regardless of the industry, social media is a highly effective platform that has the ability 
                                                 
16 Conor Carroll, “Defying a Reputational Crisis—Cadbury’s Salmonella Scare: Why Are Customers 
Willing to Forgive And Forget?,” Corporate Reputation Review 12, no. 1 (2009): 64–82, 
doi:10.1057/crr.2008.34.  
17 Lan Ye and Eyun-Jung Ki, “Organizational Crisis Communication on Facebook: A Study of BP’s 
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill,” Corporate Communications: An International Journal 22, no. 1 (2017): 80–
92, doi:10.1108/ccij-07-2015-0045.  
18 W. Timothy Coombs, Ongoing Crisis Communication, 1st ed. (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2015).  
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to stimulate a crisis, help it develop traction, and cause it to become a widely viewed, 
newsworthy incident. According to Gonzalez-Herrero and Smith, “The internet has 
revolutionized crisis communications management.”19 As suggested by Jordan, Upright, 
and Tice-Owens, in order for organizational leaders to successfully manage a crisis, they 
must expand active social media platforms and become actively involved during the pre-
crisis, crisis, and post-crisis stages.20 
An effective and dominant model presented in the literature is called Situational 
Crisis Communication Theory.21 The theory presents a two-step guide to help an 
organization select the best communication strategy during the pre-crisis, crisis, and post-
crisis stages. Step one involves identifying within which of the three “crisis clusters” a 
crisis falls: the “victim cluster, accidental cluster, or preventable cluster.”22 Victim 
cluster crises are those that are not normally attributed to, or the responsibility of, the 
organization, such as natural disasters, inaccurate rumors, and unforeseen workplace 
violence.23 Accidental cluster crises are those for which the organization has low to mid-
level responsibility, such as technical errors and minor accidents.24 Finally, “the 
preventable cluster includes human error that results in harm or accidents,” violation of 
policy or law, “or actions that place people at risk.”25 Step two requires leadership to 
actively examine the organization’s established reputation to determine which 
communication strategy should be employed, ranging from an accommodative strategy 
(in the form of a public apology) to a defensive strategy (in the form of denial or 
excuses).26 
                                                 
19 Alfonso Gonzalez-Herrero and Suzanne Smith, “Crisis Communications Management 2.0: 
Organizational Principles to Manage Crisis in an Online World,” Organization Development Journal 28, 
no. 1 (2010): 97.   
20 Tricia Ann Jordan, Paula Upright, and Kristeen Tice-Owens, “Crisis Management in Nonprofit 
Organizations: A Case Study of Crisis Communication and Planning,” Journal of Nonprofit Education and 
Leadership 6, no. 2 (2016), doi:10.18666/jnel-2016-v6-i2-6996.  
21 Coombs, Ongoing Crisis Communication.  
22 Ibid, 157.  
23 Ibid.  
24 Ibid.  
25 Ibid.  
26 Ibid.  
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2. Transparency 
Unlike for crisis communication, there are no established models or paradigms for 
transparency. However, nearly all of the reviewed literature suggests that with the 
increasing call for transparency, corporate leaders need to start accepting the concept, on 
some level, as an essential component for success and relationship-building. 
Consequently, this literature review analyzes the academic study of transparency, as well 
as ideas from varying authors and their expressed levels of transparency in the private 
sector.  
Although transparency has been touted as the key to organization–stakeholder and 
organization–public relationships, there has been little consensus on the term’s true 
definition. It is often difficult for organizations to conceptualize and understand the 
construct of transparency, and how it supports organizational trustworthiness. For the 
purpose of this thesis, transparency is defined as “the perceived quality of intentionally 
shared information from a sender.”27 Although seemingly oversimplified, this definition 
highlights knowledge-sharing as a critical element, suggesting that information exchange 
between two parties increases awareness, coherence, and comprehensibility. Using this 
definition, organizations can deduce that transparency—which relies on the concept that 
organizations must be open and accountable to the public—is an antecedent to public 
trust.  
Researchers have constantly guarded the concept of transparency as the key to 
“creating, maintaining, or repairing trust, either explicitly or implicitly.”28 This concept, 
however appealing it sounds, is without value unless it is fairly and forcefully 
implemented in a timely and appropriate manner. Consequently, in order to achieve 
desired goals and objectives during a crisis, leadership must develop a concise framework 
                                                 
27 Andrew K. Schnackenberg and Edward C. Tomlinson, “Organizational Transparency: A New 
Perspective on Managing Trust in Organization-Stakeholder Relationships,” Journal Of Management 42, 
no. 7 (2014): 1788, doi:10.1177/0149206314525202.  
28 Ibid, 1784.  
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consisting of specific activities with the understanding that sustainability during the crisis 
is heavily dependent on societal and social influences.29  
Montgomery and Tollett have developed a “six-step transparency model designed 
to assist companies with corporate transparency.”30 Their report, which was generated by 
the Global Environmental Management Initiative, is a well-rounded, in-depth review of 
transparency-related opportunities and risks, supported by case studies, that companies 
can review with their own organizations in mind to develop and implement tailored 
transparency strategies. This study is the most academically sound study reviewed in the 
literature, and focuses on pre-crisis trust-building. The authors stress the need for a 
company to institutionalize transparency in their corporate culture, and highlight the 
causes and effects of transparency in relation to pre-crisis and post-crisis environments.  
However, not all reviewed sources exploit or endorse transparency. Harvard 
Business Review’s case study of Apple shows how the company, one of the most 
successful companies in modern history, contradicts the “success through openness” 
theory. According to the study’s authors, Steve Jobs, who arguably belongs in the 
pantheon of America’s greatest innovators and chief executive officers (CEOs), 
embraced secrecy and purposely withheld information from his consumers and even his 
employees.31 A limitation to the applicability of this study is that the public does not 
normally accept secrecy in the name of innovation.  
On the other side of the transparency spectrum is an innovative form of 
transparency called “radical openness.” According to Williams and Tapscott, the smartest 
and most successful organizations are those that shun secretive practices and embrace 
transparency as a means to speed up a company’s metabolism.32 The authors, whose 
claims appear to be just as polarizing as those in the Apple study, assert that proactively 
                                                 
29 Leslie Montgomery and Robin Tollett, Transparency: A Path to Public Trust (Washington, DC: 
Global Environmental Management Initiative, 2004).  
30 Ibid, iii.  
31 Cameron Craig, “What I Learned From 10 Years of Doing PR For Apple,” Harvard Business 
Review, July 27, 2016.  
32 Anthony D. Williams and Don Tapscott, Radical Openness: Four Unexpected Principles for 
Success, 28th ed. (New York: TED Conferences, 2013).  
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assessing the information needs of a company’s consumers and willingly disclosing 
information essential to building and maintaining public trust are keystones of today’s 
most successful organizations.33 
3. Organizational Reform 
Most economists and strategists who study the private sector agree that there is 
nothing permanent except change.34 At its core, organizational reform can be defined as 
“modifying or altering existing occupational practices and strategies that affect the whole 
organization.”35 The studies on organizational change and reform indicate that there are 
varying levels of change a corporation can successfully achieve. The studies disagree, 
however, on the suggested model for organizational reform. Bart Tkaczyk, the author of 
A Playbook for Positive Organizational Change: Energize, Redesign, and Gel, examines 
and promotes a modern, three-step model for organizational change.36 Tkaczyk provides 
a clear and effective framework that can be generalized as dynamic and continuous, 
which is particularly beneficial in a hyperactive corporate environment. A limitation of 
this theoretical perspective is that the framework and its inherent components never stop 
changing and moving. This makes this model nearly impossible for large organizations to 
implement.  
A competing change model in the literature is the traditional model, which 
focuses on a three-step framework of “freeze, rebalance, and unfreeze.”37 This model is 
widely accepted as the most influential one, and has “dominated the theory and practice 
of organizational change management” since 2000.38 Although this model presents a 
strong theoretical approach to change, it also comes with inherent limitations. For 
                                                 
33 Williams and Tapscott, Radical Openness, 73.  
34 Andy Rockwood, “There Is Nothing Permanent Except Change,” Rock Solid Business 
Development, accessed October 20, 2017, http://rocksolidbizdevelopment.com/ourblog/there-is-nothing-
permanent-except-change/.   
35 Patrick Dawson, Understanding Organizational Change, 1st ed. (London: SAGE, 2003), 16. 
36 Bart Tkaczyk, “A Playbook for Positive Organizational Change: Energize, Redesign, and Gel,” 
Strategic 24, no. 6 (2015): 527–540, doi:10.1002/jsc.2041.  
37 Ibid, 530.  
38 Ibid.  
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example, in reality, one “cannot completely freeze time to subsequently take part in 
sense-making.”39 Therefore it is often difficult to assess which change strategies are 
effective and which are ineffective because “the present and the future never cease to 
materialize.”40 
Other studies focus on two related, but fundamentally different, forms of 
organizational reform: radical and incremental. Radical changes are large-scale, abrupt, 
and fairly comprehensive.41 The type of organization reform that addresses radical 
changes is one that corporations employ to deal with extremely unpredictable and 
uncertain environments. The study of Harley-Davidson President and Chief Operating 
Officer Rich Teerlink documents a radical change philosophy that turned around a 
company on the brink of collapse.42 In contrast, incremental change requires a reform 
philosophy that an organization can adopt in a gradual, calculated, and stable manner.43 
Researchers describe this type of organizational reform as advanced since it takes an 
already highly functioning company and implements continuous process improvements 
and fine-tuning of initiatives.44 Both forms of organizational change are intuitive, but 
neither appears to be supported by any research with empirical data. 
The literature reviewed suggests that trust and perceived legitimacy form the 
fundamental foundation for any successful corporation. In many ways, a company’s 
economic downturn is, at its core, a crisis of trust. One of many lessons from the 
literature is that, in a highly competitive market where capitalism has engendered crisis 
for a company’s bottom line, the issue of public trust has never been so significant. 
Academics have extensively studied reputation and crisis management strategies in the 
private sector so that corporations can critically understand how trust is built, maintained, 
                                                 
39 Tkaczyk, “A Playbook for Positive Organizational Change,” 530.  
40 Ibid.  
41 Lihua Zhang, Xiaoyu Huang, and Cailing Feng, “A Multilevel Study of Transformational 
Leadership, Dual Organizational Change and Innovative Behavior in Groups,” Journal of Organizational 
Change Management 29, no. 6 (2016): 855–877, doi:10.1108/jocm-01-2016-0005.  
42 Rich Teerlink and Lee Oxley, More than a Motorcycle: The Leadership Journey at Harley-
Davidson, 1st ed. (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2000).  
43 Zhang, Huang, and Feng, “Transformational Leadership.” 
44 Ibid.  
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and recovered following a crisis. Building a corporation’s reputation for trustworthiness 
does not consequentially happen, and studies have proven that this requires a 
considerable amount of effort. 
B. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis focuses on identifying the best techniques for reputation and crisis 
management through case studies of the private sector’s best practices. Case study 
analysis is “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon (the case) 
in depth and within its real-world context, especially when the boundaries between the 
phenomenon and context may not be clearly evident.”45 Case studies are particularly 
helpful for exploring research questions involving strategies because they allow the 
researcher to trace strategic processes and measure their effectiveness. Further, this thesis 
employs case study analysis because “case study research has the ability to detail the 
exploratory and explanatory function of research,” and can be the basis of significant 
evaluative generalizations that can be applied to a variety of disciplines.46  
According to Jonathan Crane, presenting different and varying effective strategies 
requires an analysis of multiple, single cases separately.47 As Crane does in his book, this 
thesis introduces an effective reputation and crisis management strategy through a 
separate case study, which is presented in its own chapter. These cases have in common 
strong evidence for their effectiveness, but vary in their strategies. This approach allows 
the researcher to draw cross-case generalizable conclusions and present a cross-program 
analysis in the final chapter.  
The case studies selected for this thesis have not been selected at random; they are 
based on the “typical cross-case” method for case selection and analysis.48 As opposed to 
the deviant, extreme, or diverse models, the typical cross-case study method “focuses on 
a case, or cases, that represent stable, cross-case examples of an existing model or 
                                                 
45 Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research, 5th ed. (London: SAGE, 2014), 16.  
46 Ibid., 7.  
47 Jonathan Crane, Social Programs That Work, 1st ed. (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1998).  
48 Jason Seawright and John Gerring, “Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research,” Political 
Research Quarterly 61, no. 2 (2008): 299, doi:10.1177/1065912907313077.  
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accepted conclusion that can be representative of a population of cases.”49 This model is 
often used in an exploratory manner, such as in this thesis, for which the goal “is to probe 
the mechanisms that may either confirm or disconfirm a given theory.”50 Therefore, case 
studies selected for this thesis represent an existing theory in reputation and crisis 
management, and the research explores whether they could, or should, be applied to law 
enforcement through a holistic, cross-case relationship. 
Each of the four following strategies have been deemed, through case studies, as 
effective in managing a crisis and subsequently re-branding an organization’s post-crisis 
reputation. The research design for this thesis involves providing an in-depth analysis of 
each case presented, identifying the effective strategy employed by the private-sector 
organization, and probing the accepted model or strategy vis-à-vis law enforcement. 
Through this cross-case methodology, law enforcement agencies may develop effective 
crisis and reputation management strategies. The strategies and accompanying case 
studies evaluated in this thesis are:  
1. Crisis communication via social media: BP oil spill  
2. Transparency: Volkswagen diesel scandal   
3. Organizational reform: Mattel toy recall crisis  
4. Shaping the narrative: Target data breach 
It should be noted that, regardless of the academically robust research design, 
there are limitations to this approach, and the applied conclusions and recommendations 
of this thesis may not significantly repair the currently strained relationship between law 
enforcement and the American public for a variety of reasons. First, reputation and crisis 
management techniques relevant to the private sector may not translate to law 
enforcement at all. For example, the private sector measures the success of an 
organization’s brand post crisis through increased profits; law enforcement, however, 
cannot use profits as a trust barometer. And although many progressive law enforcement 
                                                 
49 Seawright and Gerring, “Case Selection Techniques,” 299.  
50 Ibid, 297.  
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agencies want to know how they are doing from the citizens’ perspectives, very few 
actually make consistent efforts to solicit reliable feedback from citizens about 
perceptions of police performance following a crisis. 
Second, even if the reputation and crisis management strategies analyzed in this 
thesis can be tailored for law enforcement, there is no guarantee that a successful and 
measurable trust paradigm can be developed for law enforcement. Because every city, 
jurisdiction, and population is different, there is no one single model that can be evenly 
applied across the nation. 
Finally, many law enforcement executives resist change on an organizational 
level. Entrenched in culture and tradition, these agencies limp along from year to year, 
unable to accept reform as a way to turn a mediocre department into a professional and 
responsive police organization. 
Regardless of these impediments and limitations, the aim of this thesis was to 
explore case studies to determine whether reputation and crisis management techniques 
relevant to the private sector can assist law enforcement in successfully regaining the 
trust of the American public. 
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II. AUTONOMY OF CRISIS AND REPUTATION 
MANAGEMENT 
The amount of research, and subsequent literature, on reputation management is 
growing in parallel to crisis management research.51 In fact, the disciplines of reputation 
management and crisis management are very much interconnected. According to 
corporate reputation management experts Laura Tucker and T.C. Melewar, “One of the 
most important functions of crisis management is reputation management”; this thesis 
focuses on the interaction between these two disciplines.52  
In its simplest form, the definition of organizational reputation is “the extent in 
which an organization is held in high esteem or regard.”53 Organizational reputation, on a 
fundamental level, is “the perception that stakeholders have of the organization, and the 
way in which it is perceived as ‘good’ and ‘bad.’”54 The simplicity of this definition can 
be useful in that there is little potential for misunderstanding or misinterpretation. 
Further, this definition of reputation is most relevant and important, and even pivotal, 
during a time of crisis. Because the two concepts have become inherently linked to one 
another, the definition of reputation could be used to develop an adequate definition for 
crisis.55  
In the private sector, the definition of crisis has undergone countless revisions and 
modernizations, and much debate. However, this thesis utilizes the following definition 
of a crisis: “a damaging event, or series of events, with emergent properties that extend 
an organization’s ability to cope with the task demands that it generates, and has 
considerable implications for the organization and its stakeholders, in that damage can be 
                                                 
51 Carroll, “Defying A Reputational Crisis.”  
52 Laura Tucker and T.C. Melewar, “Corporate Reputation and Crisis Management: The Threat and 
Manageability of Anti-corporatism,” Corporate Reputation Review 7, no. 4 (2005): 378, doi:10.1057/ 
palgrave.crr.1540233.  
53 Ibid, 378.  
54 Ibid.  
55 Ibid, 379.  
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physical, financial, or reputational in scope.”56 Moreover, crises are an inevitable and 
integral part of any organization’s maturity process. “By their very nature, crises are 
highly complex and contextualized events, which occur due to a [very] unique set of 
variables interacting with each other,” and have the capacity to seriously jeopardize the 
survival of an organization.57  
Reputation management and crisis management are not mutually exclusive. 
Reputation managers, or those who care about the organization’s reputation, must fully 
understand and appreciate the concepts of crises and crisis management. Even small 
system failures can lead to catastrophic consequences for an organization’s reputation. 
Moreover, organization reputation “is both a factor and consequence of crisis 
management”; successful crisis management could lead to an improved reputation, while 
ineffectual crisis management could lead to a damaged reputation.58 Therefore, in order 
to truly effectively a crisis, reputation-minded managers must recognize and fully 
understand the anatomy of the crisis. 
Although every crisis is different and requires a unique response, crisis 
management expert John R. Darling claims, “Any given crisis can consist of four 
different and distinct phases:  
1. Preliminary crisis [or pre-crisis] stage; 
2. Acute crisis stage; 
3. Chronic crisis stage; 
4. Crisis resolution [or post-crisis] stage.”59 
 
                                                 
56 Carroll, “Defying A Reputational Crisis,” 65. 
57 Ibid.   
58 Tucker, “Corporate Reputation and Crisis Management,” 382.  
59 John P. McCray, Juan J. Gonzalez, and John R. Darling, “Crisis Management in Smart Phones: The 
Case of Nokia Vs Apple,” European Business Review 23, no. 3 (2011): 248, doi:10.1108/095553411111 
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Although these phases are normally present in all crises, the longevity and intensity of 
each stage are highly irregular.60 The operative challenge in crisis management is 
recognizing the markers for each phase, and proactively intervening in an appropriate 
manner.  
The following sections describe each phase, using a real-world example for 
illustration and clarification. The example depicted in this chapter is the shooting of 
Michael Brown by a police officer in Ferguson, Missouri, on August 9, 2014. Since the 
shooting, this case has been thoroughly analyzed by industry experts and academics, and 
the crisis can be now be evaluated using the four-stage crisis model.  
A. PRELIMINARY CRISIS (PRE-CRISIS) STAGE 
In some cases, the preliminary, or pre-crisis, stage is often “oblique and hard to 
recognize.”61 At other times, this stage of the crisis is evident, though its timing is 
inappropriate for action. In either case, “the preliminary crisis stage is the ‘warning 
phase,’ which may be extremely short and protracted.”62 The reason this stage is so 
important is because it provides an opportunity to proactively address the crisis before it 
becomes acute. Identifying the warnings of a potential crisis early allows the organization 
to manage the problem “before it erupts and causes [increased] complications.”63 
Because of this, “the ideal crisis management paradigm” would facilitate managing, and 
even mitigating, any potential crisis during this phase.64 Unfortunately, most crisis 
management research indicates there are direct and indirect warnings and markers that 
are either left undetected, handled inadequately, or simply ignored altogether during this 
stage.65 
                                                 
60 John R. Darling, “Crisis Management in International Business,” Leadership & Organization 
Development Journal 15, no. 8 (1994): 3–8, doi:10.1108/01437739410073047.  
61 McCray, Gonzalez, and Darling, “Crisis Management in Smart Phones,” 249.  
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid.  
64 Ibid.  
65 Hooshang Kuklan, “Managing Crises: Challenges and Complexities,” SAM Advanced Management 
Journal 51, no. 4 (1986): 39–44.  
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The pre-crisis stage was evident in the Ferguson case long before the shooting of 
Michael Brown occurred. However, as noted previously, most analysts point out that the 
city of Ferguson and the Ferguson Police Department ignored many of the social and 
historical warning indicators that led to the crisis.66 Although most citizens in St. Louis 
County are white, the city of Ferguson, in addition to its neighboring cities, comprises a 
predominantly black population.67 The demographic composition shifted in the early 
2000s as most of the white population relocated to nearby suburbs, leaving a highly 
segregated, economically repressed community, with one in four residents living below 
the poverty line.68  
This nearly all-black community was policed by a nearly all-white police 
department. Of the fifty-three commissioned police officers, only four officers were black 
at the time of the incident.69 Race relations between the police and community are even 
more pronounced when considering African Americans accounted for 86 percent of all 
Ferguson Police Department traffic stops, and 92 percent of all arrests.70 A U.S. 
Department of Justice report on the Ferguson Police Department and its practices 
indicates racial tension and disparity existed in Ferguson for decades prior to the 
incident.71 The Department of Justice report did not simply identify evidence of 
unintentional racists practices; on the contrary, the report found “discriminatory intent” in 
Ferguson’s police department.72 The U.S. government accused the police department of 
focusing on revenue over public safety needs, and generating a culture of racial bias and 
                                                 
66 Nathan Palmer, “Bringing Ferguson into Context,” Sociology In Focus, August 25, 2014, 
http://sociologyinfocus.com/2014/08/bringing-ferguson-into-context/.   
67 Larry Buchanan et al., “What Happened In Ferguson?,” New York Times, last modified August 10, 
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71 Ta-Nehisi Coates, “The Residents of Ferguson Do Not Have a Police Problem. They Have a Gang 
Problem,” Atlantic, March 5, 2015, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/03/The-Gangsters-
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72 U.S. Department of Justice, Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department (Washington, DC: 
U.S. Department of Justice, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-
releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf.   
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stereotyping that led to unconstitutional policing practices and techniques.73 The report 
also obtained data from the Ferguson Police Department that established clear racial 
disparities, “resulting in actions that have sown deep mistrust between parts of the 
community and the police department.”74 
The Department of Justice report highlights that pre-crisis warnings had 
manifested for years; however, as discussed in the description of the pre-crisis phase, the 
city of Ferguson and its police department did nothing to proactively manage or address 
the pending crisis.  
B. ACUTE CRISIS STAGE 
The beginning of the acute crisis stage marks “the point of no return” with respect 
to crisis management.75 The acute crisis stage is delineated by an identifiable incident or 
occurrence with “a great deal of potential negative impact.”76 One of the most 
challenging aspects of the acute crisis stage is the “avalanche-like speed and intensity” 
the crisis unfolds.77 Although this stage is often the shortest of the four, it is the stage 
most organizations feel is the longest due to its magnitude and momentum. The key to the 
acute crisis stage is “to [proactively] control and manage the crisis,” with the goal of 
dissipating negative consequences.78 If the acute crisis cannot be completely controlled, 
the organization should, at the very least, “attempt to exert some level of influence over 
where, how, and when the crisis erupts further.”79 Most interesting, if an organization 
heeds the warnings identified in the preliminary crisis stage, and proactively prepares for 
the acute crisis stage, there is a strong possibility for the organization to rapidly transition 
from “the acute crisis stage directly to the crisis resolution, [or post-crisis,] stage.”80 
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However, if the organization does not make plans to adequately handle the acute crisis 
stage, it enters arguably the most difficult of the crisis stages: the chronic crisis stage.  
In the Ferguson case, the acute crisis stage struck at approximately 12:00 p.m. on 
August 9, 2014, when Officer Darren Wilson of the Ferguson Police Department shot and 
killed Michael Brown, an unarmed 18-year-old.81 This incident unleashed years of 
repressed aggression from the community, culminating in violent protests that ultimately 
led Missouri Governor Jay Nixon to declare a state of emergency.82 As predicted in the 
definition of this stage, the Ferguson Police Department was ill-equipped to handle the 
crisis. Combined with the department’s failure to heed pre-crisis warnings, the negative 
consequences associated with this incident snowballed with avalanche-like speed. Since 
the organization could not manage or resolve the acute crisis stage, it moved into the 
chronic crisis stage almost immediately following the shooting.  
C. CHRONIC CRISIS STAGE 
“In the chronic crisis stage, the crisis may come under some degree of control, but 
may be long in duration and require a significant amount of resources.”83 Additionally, 
the adverse effects of the crisis clearly still remain, along with the negative consequences 
for the organization’s reputation. This stage also marks the beginning of “recovery, self-
analysis, self-doubt, and healing.”84 Most organizations that do not have a crisis 
management plan in place spend a tremendous amount of time in the chronic crisis stage 
for any given crisis. If an organization cannot regain control during the chronic stage, it 
will remain in this stage for an indeterminate amount of time. As the chronic crisis stage 
comes to an end, an organization should prepare to move into the resolution, or post-
crisis stage.  
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The chronic crisis stage in the Ferguson case is marked by widespread protests in 
the city of Ferguson.85 It should be noted this incident also served as a flashpoint for 
protests across the nation; for the purposes of this analysis, however, the focus remains 
on Ferguson, Missouri. Protests in the city of Ferguson continued during the weeks 
following the shooting, as well as following the announcement that the grand jury 
declined to charge Officer Wilson with murder.86 Since the Ferguson Police Department 
clearly did not have a crisis plan in place, the department remained trapped in the chronic 
crisis stage for months following the shooting before finally moving into the crisis 
resolution stage.  
D. CRISIS RESOLUTION (POST-CRISIS) STAGE 
The crisis resolution stage is an evaluative phase during which the organization’s 
goal is to determine if the crisis can be transformed into an opportunity.87 Truly strong 
and capable organizations are able to adapt and facilitate future growth and development. 
“The term transformational is used in this context to signify crisis, when viewed and 
managed as opportunities, can often provide a basis for creative change and development 
in the life of an organization.”88 The goal of this stage, therefore, is for an organization to 
use the crisis to create positive organizational changes that will improve its reputation.  
The Ferguson Police Department is currently in the post-crisis stage, and will 
most likely remain there for years to come. With a number of governmental and non-
governmental agencies evaluating its policing practices and techniques, the department 
was forced to identify ways to transform and develop into a more sophisticated, 
legitimate law enforcement agency. Unfortunately, this phase has proven difficult; 
although the crisis occurred in 2014, the Ferguson Police Department still struggles to 
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recruit and retain qualified individuals willing to fill double-digit vacancies.89 Financial 
constraints related to the shooting and death of Michael Brown caused the city to reduce 
the amount of money it allocates to the police department, including decreased starting 
salaries for new officers.90 Although the goal of the post-crisis stage is to create positive 
changes stemming from lessons learned during a crisis, it is unknown whether the 
Ferguson Police Department will be able to adapt and grow in a meaningful way that will 
result in an improved organizational reputation.   
Much like the Ferguson case, crises are an unavoidable part of any organization’s 
life. According to Hooshang Kuklan, “No firm, regardless of its size, nature of 
operations, or type of industry, is immune to crisis.”91 Additionally, as insisted by crisis 
expert Steven Fink, “If you are not now in a crisis, you are instead in a pre-crisis situation 
and should make immediate preparations for the crisis that looms on the horizon.”92 No 
two crises are alike; some are minor, some are major. Some crises take a long time to 
surface, while others seem to explode in front of an organization. Some crises can be life 
threatening to the organization, while others do not necessarily mean failure and 
catastrophe. The only element consistent among crises is that they are a pivotal moment 
for the reputation of an organization. Therefore, it is crucial for any organization to be 
prepared to manage, endure, and learn from a crisis that will inevitably surface. 
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III. CRISIS COMMUNICATION VIA SOCIAL MEDIA 
According to leading reputation management expert W. Timothy Coombs, 
understanding the role of communication during a crisis is essential to protecting an 
organization’s reputation.93 Acknowledging that “a crisis is an inherent threat to an 
organization’s reputation,” and reputation is the single most valuable intangible asset a 
company owns, effective crisis communication is a widely researched and employed 
reputation management strategy.94 However, against the backdrop of improved 
information technology, the concept of crisis communication has dramatically changed. 
Communication through social media and similar online services is at the top of the 
agenda for many scholarly and innovative crisis communication experts.95 In fact, as 
society harnesses and exploits the power of social media, organizations “are at a distinct 
strategic disadvantage” when they fail to employ communication platforms such as 
Facebook, Twitter, or YouTube.96  
Unfortunately, many law enforcement agencies find themselves in the crosshairs 
of this distinct strategic disadvantage. Although many law enforcement executives agree 
that social media can lead to increased legitimacy, improved community communication, 
and more effective community policing, intertwining law enforcement and social media 
in a meaningful manner is still not a widely accepted practice.97 Even fewer police 
departments have actively leveraged social media as an avenue for crisis communication, 
resulting in an industry that has yet to capitalize on social media as a means to create new 
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possibilities for interpersonal, participatory, and interactive communications.98 With this 
in mind, this chapter presents and analyzes a case study in which communication on 
social media proved to be an effective crisis and reputation management strategy.  
A. INTRODUCTION TO THE CASE 
British Petroleum (BP) was originally founded in 1909 under the company name 
Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Ltd., and “became one of the world’s largest oil 
companies” after merging with the U.S. company Amoco Corporation in 1998.99 The oil 
rig Deepwater Horizon was owned by an offshore oil drilling company called 
Transocean, and leased by BP.100 On April 20, 2010, the Deepwater Horizon oil rig 
suffered a catastrophic explosion off the Gulf of Mexico, resulting “in the loss of 11 lives 
and the largest marine oil spill in the history of the United States.”101 During the eighty-
four days following the explosion, an immense amount of Louisiana sweet crude oil, 
methane, and other gases were released from 1,480 meters below the ocean’s surface.102 
The U.S. government estimated that nearly 5 million barrels of oil flooded the Gulf of 
Mexico.103 It took scientists and experts nearly three months—until July 15, 2010—to 
cap the oil well.104 The public largely blamed BP for the crisis and, following an 
investigation, the company was widely criticized for its cost-cutting decisions leading up 
to the explosion.  
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B. PROBLEMS FACED FOLLOWING THE CRISIS 
For the ten years prior to the explosion, BP’s corporate brand position emphasized 
the company’s focus on environmental concerns, good corporate citizenship, and “green” 
credentials.105 For over a decade, BP had solidified a corporate reputation that 
communicated a friendly, unobtrusive, and demonstrably non-corporate American 
(despite the company’s true name) character. However, after the explosion of the 
Deepwater Horizon platform, BP’s strong reputation and position as one of the globe’s 
most responsible and successful oil companies was jeopardized. BP’s financial viability 
also came under threat; BP ultimately paid “$4.5 billion in fines and penalties to the 
government, and pled guilty to 14 criminal charges.”106 In 2015, following a civil trial, 
BP agreed to pay $20 billion to companies and individuals affected by the spill.107 
C. REPUTATION AND CRISIS STRATEGY   
BP’s executive management recognized they were experiencing a slow-moving, 
long-term crisis that threatened the company’s reputation. BP executives, along with 
many public relations experts, soon realized BP’s traditional crisis communication efforts 
such as official statements, press releases, and morning show appearances were not as 
effective as they once were.108 In response to this realization, BP integrated a social 
media component into its crisis communication campaign that included Facebook, 
Twitter, and YouTube.109  
BP used social media to establish two-way, participatory communication with the 
public, augmented by photos, videos, and maps that tracked the spill and cleanup 
efforts.110 The company, in coalition with other entities involved in the cleanup process, 
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even created an entirely new website, the now-defunct deepwaterhorizonresponse.com, 
so the group could provide updates, respond to incoming inquiries, and share new 
developments.111 An in-depth analysis of BP’s social media movement during the 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill revealed the following activities employed by BP as part of 
its crisis communication strategy: 
• BP created a section on its corporate website dedicated to the explosion 
that specifically detailed mitigation efforts; 
• BP employed bloggers who were tasked with updating followers on the 
spill and the cleanup process; 
• BP dedicated its entire Facebook page to daily updates, allowing the 
public to respond and/or comment on the company’s activity; 
• BP completely repurposed its Twitter account to include regular updates, 
messages, and contact information for representatives responsible for 
responding to media and public inquiries; 
• BP created a YouTube channel solely for streaming videos that addressed 
affected wildlife in the areas surrounding the Gulf; 
• BP utilized Flickr to showcase images of the Gulf of Mexico; and finally, 
• BP ran a twenty-four-hour live stream of the oil leak and resulting spill.112 
During the eight-and-a-half-month timeframe, BP posted 3,497 Facebook 
messages, over 90 percent of which provided hyperlinks to detailed information for the 
public.113 BP also tweeted over 1,000 spill-related messages on Twitter between the day 
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of the explosion and the day the leak was stopped.114 Nearly 100 videos were uploaded to 
BP’s official YouTube channel, showing an evolution from explosion, to disaster control, 
and finally to tourism advocacy.115 By all accounts, it appeared BP transformed its crisis 
communication strategy from irregular, sterile press releases to transparent and 
interactive electronic communications that exploited major social media platforms and 
mediums.  
Before discussing the results of BP’s crisis communication strategy, it should be 
noted the BP case study is particularly unique because BP did not have a social media 
presence or dedicated social media staff prior to the oil rig explosion.116 In fact, since 
joining Facebook in 2007, BP had only posted four messages on its BP America 
Facebook page prior to the incident.117 Although it had an active Twitter account, BP 
America’s Twitter page had only two to three tweets per month.118 BP America did not 
even have a YouTube channel prior to the explosion.119 This is particularly important 
because the company, which did not have any established expertise or skill for social 
media communication, chose social media as its main component for crisis 
communication, and maximized the value of the tools. Therefore, this case presents a 
near-pure analysis of an organization’s effort to contain a crisis and manage its reputation 
through social media.  
D. STRATEGY RESULTS 
A number of crisis communication and public relations experts have evaluated 
BP’s reputation management and crisis communication strategies. According to the 
experts, BP’s information-giving efforts on Facebook was not only effective, but 
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achieved favorable responses from the public following the explosion and subsequent 
mitigation efforts.120 Although some experts agree that it took BP too long to engage its 
crisis communication strategy on social media platforms, ultimately, BP received 57,344 
“likes” and 180,744 positive comments during the eight-and-a-half-month evaluation 
period.121 Most of the positive comments were generated when BP initiated Facebook 
posts that gave informational updates, particularly when the company took responsibility 
and indicated corrective actions taken, and when it made those affected by the crisis a 
priority.122 According to Forbes, the global media company that focuses on business, 
leadership, and entrepreneurship, BP’s “candid language delivered in a remorseful tone” 
successfully and undoubtedly portrayed BP’s commitment to restoring its reputation with 
the general public.123  
Today, seven years after the spill, BP continues to attract investment, and 
continues to sell oil in great quantities. Although still working under the Deepwater 
Horizon cloud, BP shares continued to increase, up by 25 percent in June 2016, and even 
inched up to 27 percent following the Brexit vote.124 Some analysts claim BP shares will 
be worth more in 2018 than they were in 2010, immediately before the explosion.125 
According to BP CEO, Tony Hayward, Facebook greatly assisted in BP’s apology 
campaign and provided the road to recovering the general public’s trust.126 Additionally, 
communication experts claim BP performed exceptionally when it came to mitigating the 
crisis on social media and the Internet.127 Throughout the entire event, Hayward and BP 
used Facebook and Twitter to post updates, photos, videos, and hyperlinks to regain 
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public trust in small, incremental steps, while maintaining the viability and profitability 
of the company.  
E. ANALYSIS 
Social media and the Internet have not only become the preferred platform for 
information dissemination and communication for customers, stakeholder, and the media, 
but they have also revolutionized reputation and crisis management. Increasingly, 
corporations and organizations view managing their reputation during a crisis through 
online monitoring and strategies as an essential part of their vitality.128 Organizations 
have learned that crises, much like viruses, can now spread and mutate in dynamic ways 
through social forums like Facebook or video distribution sites such as YouTube.129 One 
thing is for certain: communication experts agree that managing a crisis and an 
organization’s reputation in the brick-and-mortar world is in no way similar to reputation 
and crisis management in the virtual world.130  
BP’s success stemmed from its CEO’s willingness to engage the public on social 
media platforms. BP recognized that social media provided a pulpit for interactive 
communication with its stakeholders and the public, and used this pulpit to deliver its 
message rapidly in order to potentially diminish any further negative effects associated 
with the oil spill.131 More importantly, feedback BP received from Facebook and Twitter 
users enabled the organization to assess whether stakeholders and the public accepted its 
crisis management responses and strategies.132  
Using BP’s strategy following the Deepwater Horizon explosion as a model for 
crisis communication via social media, an organization, regardless of industry, should 
recognize that social media has the ability to influence an organization’s reputation 
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directly and indirectly. Social media can influence an organization directly by acting as a 
source of information for stakeholders and investors, thus affecting how they decide to 
interact with the company.133 Conversely, social media can indirectly affect an 
organization’s reputation by influencing “intangible assets,” such as consumers’ attitudes 
toward the organization, which in turn govern organizational performance.134 
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IV. TRANSPARENCY 
In the late 1990s, public relations experts and researchers in the private sector 
began focusing their efforts on an organization’s ability to create mutually beneficial 
relationships with the public and stakeholders.135 The critical characteristic for long-term 
relationships, according to much of the research, is transparency.136 The concept of 
transparency readily creates an avenue for an organization “to understand, listen, and 
develop a dialogue” with the public and stakeholders, and is “viewed as a relational 
condition that promotes accountability, collaboration, cooperation, and commitment.”137 
Transparency becomes particularly relevant during a seemingly never-ending and 
uninterrupted surge of corporate crises. During a crisis, transparency is invoked as a salve 
for distressed relationships between an organization and important stakeholders, 
including the public, and has the ability to reestablish trust in the company.138 Whether 
implicitly or explicitly, researchers who adopt transparency as the foundation for 
relationships between an organization and the public have routinely advocated its 
importance in “creating, maintaining, and repairing trust during a crisis.”139 
It is important to note, for the purposes of this thesis, that being transparent does 
not necessarily mean there is no place for secrecy, particularly in government work. 
“Although the term transparency and its apparent antonym, secrecy, have assumed a 
prominent role in [contemporary] discourse,” some researchers counterclaim the two are 
symbiotic rather than inimical to each other.140 Although some public relations experts 
stress the need to choose between transparency and secrecy, this thesis does not view the 
two concepts as irreconcilable approaches to navigating a crisis. The ability to find 
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balance between transparency and secrecy during a crisis is a sign of an organization’s 
cultural and moral authority.  
Unfortunately, secrecy continues to dominate many contemporary law 
enforcement agencies, particularly during a crisis. Although law enforcement executives 
agree that transparency can lead to improved trust and increased legitimacy, nationwide 
studies of police departments suggest that law enforcement, as an industry, fails to be 
transparent in a way that allows the public to meaningfully measure and assess 
departmental operations and activities.141 As a stimulus, the President’s Task Force on 
21st Century Policing recommends that law enforcement “embrace a culture of 
transparency” when a critical incident occurs.142 Since there is no widespread consensus 
that transparency is fully espoused by law enforcement during a crisis, this chapter 
analyzes a case study in which transparency proved to be an effective crisis and 
reputation management strategy.  
A. INTRODUCTION TO THE CASE 
In the spring of 1976, Volkswagen began production of its first vehicle equipped 
with a diesel engine.143 The new generation of transmission engines proved to be a 
system that was both cost effective and more efficient than its gasoline-powered 
counterpart.144 Volkswagen even went so far as to politically promote its “clean diesel” 
as an alternative to hybrid and electric vehicles, marching in Washington, DC, with a 
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fleet of Audi TDI models.145 By 2015, Volkswagen successfully cornered 70 percent of 
the passenger diesel vehicle market in the United States.146  
Concurrent to Volkswagen’s climbing success, the International Council on Clean 
Transportation, in response to public pressure and concerns, proposed on-road emission 
tests for diesel vehicles in the United States.147 Although diesel vehicles were known to 
deliver higher mileage and power, it was discovered that diesel vehicles had a number of 
drawbacks, one being that diesel vehicles permitted higher nitrogen oxide emissions.148 
Nitrogen oxide, a smog-forming, free-radical gas, is a pollutant scientifically linked to 
cancer and tumor growth.149 In order to regulate the nitrogen oxide emission in vehicles, 
manufacturers were installing a nitrogen oxide trap in the exhaust system. However, 
manufacturers soon realized the nitrogen oxide trap negatively impacted fuel 
consumption and vehicular acceleration.150   
In order to circumvent on-road emission tests, Volkswagen surreptitiously rolled 
out software on more than “a half-million vehicles in the United States, and roughly 10.5 
million more vehicles worldwide,” that detected testing equipment and parameters set by 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).151 The defeat devices were specifically 
designed to detect when a Volkswagen vehicle was placed into testing mode, and 
artificially lowered emission levels. Therefore, in test mode, Volkswagen was in 
complete compliance with federal emission levels; in normal drive situations on the road, 
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however, the vehicle emitted nitrogen oxide at a level nearly forty times higher than the 
federal threshold.152 
In 2012, the International Council on Clean Transportation awarded a small group 
of scientists at West Virginia University a grant to test diesel vehicles.153 More 
specifically, the university was hired to provide environmental oversight agencies, such 
as the EPA, with independent data on diesel vehicles operated within the United 
States.154 Since Volkswagen was aggressively promoting diesel vehicles that were both 
fuel efficient and environmentally friendly, West Virginia University scientists tested two 
different Volkswagen models. At the conclusion of the project, scientists were unable to 
validate Volkswagen’s low emissions claims on either of the two Volkswagen vehicles 
during road tests.155  
The data, which was turned over to the EPA and the California Air Resource 
Board, was clear: the company that had the boldest emission claims and highest diesel 
sales for six years in a row was cheating the system.156 In 2015, just as Volkswagen 
cornered 70 percent of the diesel market, a global-scale crisis erupted that negatively 
impacted not only millions of Volkswagen consumers worldwide, but jeopardized 
Volkswagen’s position as the global leader of diesel vehicle sales.157  
B. PROBLEMS FACED FOLLOWING THE CRISIS 
A preliminary investigation into the defeat devices revealed that Volkswagen 
installed software into their vehicles that detected when the vehicle was placed into 
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emission test mode and shifted to a lean-burning, low-pollution mode.158 This mode 
enacted a very different engine setting than when the vehicle was in during normal road 
operations. 
Within days of these findings becoming public knowledge, Volkswagen’s stock 
was sold on massive levels, wiping out more than $16.9 billion of the company’s market 
value.159 This equated to a 30 percent plunge of the company’s market value, leaving 
Volkswagen 50 percent below its market high in March of 2015.160  
In the months following the scandal, Volkswagen suffered further economic loss 
in the form of worldwide recalls, massive decrease in sales, and the largest nosedive in 
stock market value the company had ever seen.161 Just four months after the company 
publicly admitted, “11 million diesel vehicles in the world were equipped with defeat 
devices,” the United States Department of Justice filed the first suit on behalf of the 
EPA.162 Forced to settle with three federal agencies, Volkswagen paid $14.7 billion for 
its excessive emissions scandal, more than any company has ever paid for violations of 
the Clean Air Act.163  
In January 2017, the Department of Justice arrested six Volkswagen executives 
for their knowledge of and role in the scandal, and the company was fined an additional 
$4.3 billion for criminal and civil penalties.164 In April 2017, the company was officially 
sentenced in a Michigan federal court for the violations; as probation, a corporate 
compliance company was charged to monitor Volkswagen for three years.165  
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Since the news of the scandal in 2015, over “one quarter of the company’s market 
cap has been wiped out,” and Volkswagen publicly “abandoned its goal of becoming the 
world’s largest automaker by 2018.”166 
C. REPUTATION AND CRISIS STRATEGY 
Volkswagen is arguably one of the strongest and oldest automakers in the world, 
with some of the world’s most noteworthy brands, including Lamborghini, Bugatti, and 
Bentley.167 However, its respected prominence came to an abrupt end when Volkswagen 
proved it could not be trusted. The defeat device scandal was a calculated and deliberate 
lie designed to cheat the government for no other reason than to sell more vehicles. 
Worse, according to a Gallup survey conducted in October 2015, 75 percent of 
Americans knew about the scandal, and disapproved of Volkswagen’s actions.168 
With worldwide concern and resentment growing, Volkswagen needed to respond 
appropriately if it intended to regain the public’s trust and return to making profits. Brand 
rehab expert Jonathan Bernstein of Bernstein Crisis Management stated, “VW … more 
than anything, needs to take all the necessary steps to transform their culture into one of 
transparency and honesty. All the PR in the world won’t help otherwise.”169 
Initially, Volkswagen failed to commit to this transformation. When presented 
with the EPA’s findings, Volkswagen originally chose to dispute the results, citing 
“various technical issues.”170 This public relations defense mechanism, which only 
fueled the government, Volkswagen’s critics, and the media, left more questions than 
answers from Volkswagen executive management. Recognizing that denying and 
deflecting were crisis management missteps, Volkswagen finally publicly admitted to 
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installing the cheat software. In a bold move, Volkswagen refocused its actions on 
restructuring the company’s management, and publicly committed itself to 
transparency.171 First, Volkswagen CEO Martin Winterkorn announced his retirement.172 
In a statement, Winterkorn stated, “I accept responsibility for the irregularities that have 
been found in diesel engines. Volkswagen needs a fresh start—also in terms of personnel. 
I am clearing the way for this fresh start with my resignation.”173 
The new CEO, Matthias Muller, promised to rebuild the company which was 
once held in high regard, stating, “My most urgent task is to win back trust for the 
Volkswagen Group by leaving no stone unturned and with maximum transparency, as 
well as drawing the right conclusions from the current situation.”174 Muller reinforced 
those words with calculated and public actions. He apologized to both the public and 
shareholders for betraying their trust.175 Additionally, Muller publicly announced an 
internal investigation led by an external entity, the Jones Day law firm, to determine how 
Volkswagen developed engine software specifically designed to defeat federal emission 
regulators.176  
Richard Chambers, president and CEO of the Institute of Internal Auditors, stated, 
“VW’s candor at the onset of the scandal was surprising. It’s not often when officials of a 
global company admit to potentially illegal and plainly unethical behavior. But once 
committed to transparency, Muller and VW [willingly] took on an obligation to find and 
share the truth about the scandal.”177  
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Muller vowed the internal investigation results would be shared with Volkswagen 
investors and the public, and he, as the new CEO, would be fully transparent and 
accountable.178 Muller promised the public he would reveal exactly what happened, hold 
those responsible accountable for their wrongdoings, and implement reform to ensure a 
similar incident never occurred again.179  
In order to regain the trust of a demoralized staff, Muller focused his transparency 
strategy internally as well. Just as Muller admitted guilt in external communications, he 
encouraged his management staff to have “the same direct, face-to-face communications 
internally as well, as the first step to rebuilding [employee] trust.”180 Volkswagen 
consistently encouraged employees to provide feedback, ask questions, and express their 
concerns with management. Muller openly communicated with Volkswagen employees 
about strategic shifts during the crisis, and willingly provided updates about the 
investigation as they became available.181 Using a Vienna-based employer review 
platform called Kununu, Volkswagen employees were authorized to submit reviews and 
concerns that could be seen by the general public. As of July 2017, Kununu had 514 
reviews from Volkswagen employees, 269 of which were logged following the scandal in 
2015.182 Of the 269 logged concerns and reviews from employees, 170 were publicly 
addressed by Volkswagen management.183 Johannes Pruller, head of global 
communications for Kununu, suggested this figure was “a high percentage for any 
company” utilizing the platform.184 According to Pruller, “not that many employers 
[publicly] engage in this process of reacting to [employee] feedback.”185  
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In a crisis and reputation management analysis, reputation brand consultant David 
Robertson Mitchell suggests that Volkswagen made key moves focused on transparency:  
• Volkswagen moved fast and publicly acknowledged the issue; 
• Volkswagen’s current and ex-CEO publicly apologized, and both openly 
took responsibility for the crisis; 
• Volkswagen restructured its management team to make way for fresh 
leadership to manage the company during, and beyond, the crisis; 
• Volkswagen self-initiated an investigation, conducted by an external 
entity, and vowed to make the investigation findings public; 
• Volkswagen publicly responded to consumer and employee concerns 
through social media and a transparency-focused employer rating 
platform; 
• Volkswagen recalled the affected vehicles, and stopped selling the cars in 
question throughout the United States.186 
D. STRATEGY RESULTS 
Volkswagen’s improved profitability is critically linked to its response to the 
2015 crisis. “Even though much work lies ahead for us,” said Muller in a 2017 interview, 
“2016 did not turn out to be the nightmare year that many predicted.”187 Volkswagen 
sold more vehicles than any other carmaker during the first half of 2016, including its 
close rivals Toyota and General Motors.188 Muller, who stuck to his promise for 
transparency, carried the company in a positive profit direction well into 2017. 
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Volkswagen posted first-quarter 2017 earnings that were significantly higher than analyst 
and market expectations.189 Operating profit totaled approximately $4.7 billion, which 
was 28 percent higher than the 2016 figure, and 20 percent higher than analysts’ 
predictions.190 Volkswagen’s shares rose 4.4 percent in April 2017, the biggest jump 
since the scandal broke in 2015, pushing the company’s stock up 2.7 percent.191 As of 
May 2017, Forbes reported that Volkswagen ranked number twenty-eight of the world’s 
largest public companies, with a market cap of $72.9 billion.192 Additionally, the 
company rose to number seventy-seven on the 2016 list of the world’s most valuable 
brands.193  
Most analysts of the Volkswagen case agree that the company’s success in 
navigating and surviving the diesel-gate crisis was directly linked to its open 
communication and transparency strategy, and the speed with which the strategy was 
implemented.194  
E. ANALYSIS 
This case presents two major crisis and reputation management lessons. First, 
when given the opportunity to acknowledge an error, whether intentional or not, publicly 
admitting fault and taking responsibility has a profound effect, and may prevent a 
company from losing the trust of consumers, and society at large. Second, when a crisis 
emerges, swift and controlled communication conveyed with transparency and honesty 
during the initial hours and days of the crisis is critical to preserving an organization’s 
reputation. As seen in the Volkswagen case, openly and honestly accepting responsibility 
for errors, and communicating in a genuine and forthright manner, will undoubtedly help 
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regain the public’s trust. Consumers of any good or service appreciate, and often demand, 
transparency and accountability during a crisis. Harvard Business Review contributor 
Nick Morgan summed up the strategy best when he stated, “The lessons seem to be clear: 
transparency is a good thing. Those who follow the rule get a chance to survive, even 
possibly thrive. Those who do not, suffer, and perhaps die.”195  
The Volkswagen case illustrates that transparency means more than just openness 
or disclosure; transparency, in terms of public discourse, means the enhancement of 
understanding.196 Although a common buzzword among contemporary executive 
managers, transparency, for the purposes of this thesis, means “an increase in the 
understanding of parties who are interested in the actions or decisions of an 
organization.”197 Simply put, in a public relations framework during a crisis, 
organizational transparency is the act of providing meaningful information that enhances 
understanding as opposed to simply providing data.  
Not all practitioners and academics agree, however, that complete transparency 
unilaterally creates understanding. Some authors criticize the conventional wisdom and 
neoliberal notion that “transparency helps all of the time” and that “transparency is a 
precondition for trust.”198 David De Cremer, professor at the University of Cambridge 
and Harvard Business Review contributor, contends that too much transparency can 
actually increase distrust and spark resistance if employees within an organization feel 
their autonomy and uniqueness are challenged.199 To counter this phenomenon, managers 
must execute transparency with a high level of care, emphasizing to employees, 
particularly government employees, why transparency is necessary. The importance of 
perceived legitimacy by employees, according to De Cremer, cannot be overstated when 
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applying transparency.200 When employees genuinely understand how assessments and 
decisions are made, their view of the organization’s legitimacy improves. And legitimacy 
is exactly what an organization needs in order to maintain employee cooperation when it 
comes to promulgating transparency.201  
The lessons learned from the Volkswagen diesel scandal are simple: candid and 
timely information exchange with the public and stakeholders are essential in regaining 
public trust following a crisis. Crises, and the public pressure that inevitably comes along 
with them, do not simply go away. Organizations that embrace and generally accept the 
concept of transparency as a principle and strategy, even when recognizing the need to 
maintain a certain level of privacy, rebuild their reputations following a crisis more 
quickly than their counterparts.202  
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V. ORGANIZATIONAL REFORM 
Reform is a concept that could make most executive managers of any 
organization skeptical, particularly following a major crisis. However, strong leaders 
recognize that a company navigating a crisis is perfectly poised for change.203 When a 
company’s culture is called into question and comes under public scrutiny, leadership is 
often compelled to carefully examine and debate whether current long-standing practices 
and procedures are adequate. Although nearly impossible to undertake overnight, proving 
to the public an organization can respond to a crisis by implementing meaningful and 
lasting reform is one of the first steps to regaining the public’s trust.204 No matter the 
crisis, a company has two choices: see the crisis as an opportunity for transformation or 
stay the course and risk organizational failure.  
Organizational change as a result of a crisis is about “evaluating and modifying 
management [strategies] and business processes.”205 Some experts suggest that 
“organizations are more likely to emerge stronger if leaders avoid oversimplifying the 
[crisis] and instead allow a gradual understanding to emerge and be tested in action.”206 
For an organization to move in the right direction following a crisis, leaders at every level 
must be open to change, and must be willing to implement it in a high-pressure, 
sometimes volatile, environment.207  
Many law enforcement agencies, much like other organizations experiencing a 
crisis, are in an ideal position to implement meaningful change. Experts argue that the 
only effective mechanism for sufficiently addressing the decline in public trust of law 
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enforcement is systematic reform of the law enforcement organization itself.208 However, 
law enforcement, as an industry, often fails to embrace reform. Police expert and 
criminology professor Geoffrey Alpert stated, “We know what needs to happen next, but 
we just keep studying the question instead of doing something about the answers we’ve 
arrived at.”209 Since this kind of self-analysis and transformation rarely occurs in police 
departments today, this chapter analyzes a case study in which organizational reform 
proved to be an effective crisis and reputation management strategy.  
A. INTRODUCTION TO THE CASE 
Mattel, Inc., which is based in California, was founded in 1947 and is the largest 
toymaker in the world.210 In 2014, the company was ranked number 403 in the Fortune 
500, with its current-day revenue estimated at $6.49 billion.211 The toymaker designs, 
manufactures, and distributes toys worldwide, controls brand names such as Barbie, 
Fisher-Price, and Hot Wheels, and produces products under licenses from Disney and 
Nintendo.212 In 1997, Mattel became the first toy company to create a structured 
framework that standardized the manufacturing of toys across the globe, regardless of 
with whom it contracted.213 
In addition to being the world’s largest toymaker, Mattel has incorporated social 
responsibility into its practices to capture the trust and loyalty of consumers. Shortly after 
its rise to the top, Mattel started a charity organization called the Mattel Children’s 
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Foundation.214 The incorporated foundation “aims to improve the lives of children in 
need” by funding children-based learning technologies, after-school programs, literacy 
projects, and programs that promote the health of children.215 Additionally, in 1998, 
Mattel began a “$25 million multi-year donation program to the UCLA children’s 
hospital, which is now called the Mattel Children’s Hospital at UCLA.”216 This focus on 
children helped establish long-preserved relationships with parents and communities, and 
is what helped turn a small, modest dollhouse-making company into the world’s premier 
toymaker.  
In the middle of 2007, Mattel unexpectedly experienced the worst product crisis 
in its history.217 On July 6, Mattel CEO Robert Eckert was informed by a “European 
retailer [it] found evidence of toxic lead paint in Mattel toys.”218 Lead paint was 
commonly known to present serious health concerns, particularly when ingested by 
children, and had been legally prohibited in the United States and Europe for a decade. 
An investigation into the claim revealed that Mattel toy products manufactured in a 
China-based factory contained illegal levels of lead paint.219  
By August 2007, the company alerted the public and began recalling 
approximately 1.5 million Chinese-made Fisher-Price toddler toys.220 To compound the 
crisis, a month later Mattel was forced to announce a second recall of approximately 18.2 
million toys that were made with “small, yet powerful, magnets that could potentially 
bind to a child’s intestinal tract if swallowed.”221 This second recall was immediately 
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followed by a third recall of an additional 800,000 toys across the globe due to design 
flaws and substandard manufacturing.222  
When the 2007 calendar year was over, Mattel had five separate safety recalls 
totaling more than 21 million toys in 43 international markets.223 Three American 
children suffered serious injuries that were attributed to the recalled toys.224 
B. PROBLEMS FACED FOLLOWING THE CRISIS 
Almost immediately, Mattel was heavily criticized by the media and the federal 
government for its use of China-based factories. Parents, particularly mothers, took to 
blogs and Mattel’s social media sites to express their dissatisfaction.225 One mother, 
seemingly frustrated with the numerous recalls and negative media coverage, drove to 
Mattel headquarters with a car full of Mattel toys and ordered employees to sort through 
the toys to remove any recalled items.226 A father of four children made a YouTube 
video, which garnered nearly 20,000 views, mocking Mattel for the lead recall crisis.227 
A couple who was interviewed about the recalls bashed Mattel for their slick, car-
salesman approach to the entire crisis, and blamed Mattel for using “too much red” on 
their recall website.228 
Parental backlash and declining public confidence were not the only negative 
impacts to Mattel as a result of the recalls. It was estimated that the recalls cost the 
company approximately $40 million in settled lawsuits.229 Mattel’s stock plunged by 30 
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percent between July 2007 and December 2007.230 During the height of the holiday 
season, arguably its most lucrative quarter of the year, Mattel earned only half as much 
revenue as it did during the 2006 holiday season.231  
As a result of the recalls, investor confidence in Mattel also diminished, as 
evidenced by Mattel’s falling stock price during the recall period.232 To make matters 
worse, “a large pension fund filed a shareholder’s lawsuit against Mattel in October 
2007,” alleging the company “artificially increased stock shares by purposely delaying 
recall announcements in order to sell as many faulty products as possible.”233 In 2009, 
Mattel was fined $2.9 million in civil penalties by the Consumer Product Safety 
Committee for marketing and selling non-compliant products in the United States.234  
C. REPUTATION AND CRISIS STRATEGY 
Mattel immediately stopped production in the China-based factory, agreed to 
work with federal regulatory authorities, and initiated an internal investigation. Mattel 
Chairman and CEO Robert Eckert, who already had a 114-page formal crisis plan 
prepared in advance, issued a public apology and encouraged parents to remove affected 
toys from their households.235 Eckert controlled the narrative by publicly naming the 
Chinese contractor involved in the toxic paint scandal, severing several ties with 
suppliers, and installing Mattel employees in contract manufacturer factories.236 
Fully understanding he would need the trust of Mattel’s employees at all levels 
within the organization, Eckert initiated an internal campaign to regularly update his 
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employees about the company’s response in order to prevent them from becoming 
anxious during the crisis.237 His regular and insightful email updates set the tone for 
consistent communication between executive management and line-level employees. 
Every quarter, Eckert held town-hall style meetings at Mattel headquarters, reassuring 
employees that, although he could not change the past, he could “change how [the 
company] worked in the future.”238 Eckert acknowledged that repairing trust during the 
crisis was bilateral; he needed to repair trust with the public to keep his company afloat 
while concurrently regaining his employees’ trust so they would subscribe to the 
company’s rigorous response to the crisis and organizational reform in the times to come. 
Once Eckert felt he had the trust and confidence of his employees, he outlined his 
vision of reform for the company in an opinion piece published in the Wall Street 
Journal.239 In his statement to the American public, Eckert vowed to win back the 
customer’s trust “with our deeds, not just our words” and promised “to do the right 
thing.”240 “Nobody likes recalls and I apologize for the situation we are now facing,” 
Eckert wrote, but “our long record of safety at Mattel is why we’re one of the most 
trusted names with parents. And I am confident that the actions we are taking now will 
maintain that trust.”241 
As one of his first moves, Eckert created a senior vice president of corporate 
responsibility position, which was charged with oversight of contractor and subcontractor 
auditing, and reported directly to the CEO.242 The new company architecture was 
specifically “designed to enhance the company’s leadership role in the area of global 
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citizenship” by establishing improved and increased accountability in Mattel’s safety and 
compliance protocols.243  
Under Eckert’s direct supervision, Mattel reorganized internal operations with an 
emphasis on product safety and compliance.244 Executive management created a new 
three-tiered response and control system, and made it available to all Mattel employees, 
Mattel vendors, and the public.245 The system included “testing every batch of paint” 
purchased from certified vendors, increasing controls “of every level of the production 
process,” testing every finished toy against increased safety standards before it is sent to 
retailers for public sale, and “conducting random [audits and] inspections of vendor 
facilities.”246  
Eckert also created a new team of auditors comprised of Mattel employees and 
independent researchers who traveled from vendor to vendor on a three-year rotation, 
peppered with unannounced visits, to perform inspections of factories.247 Results of the 
audits were reported in the company’s “Global Citizenship Report,” and used to identify 
opportunities for organizational reform.248 This report was released to Mattel employees 
as well as the public.  
In response to Congress’ concerns surrounding the potential hazards of children’s 
toys, Eckert appeared before a United States Senate Committee and took full 
responsibility by acknowledging that Mattel had not monitored the Chinese company 
closely enough.249 Mattel publicly called for increased federal oversight and regulation, 
and pushed for a boost in resources for the United States Consumer Product Safety 
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Commission.250 Working with the International Council of Toy Industries, Mattel built 
its own certified testing laboratories, many of which were quality-certified by the Internal 
Organization for Standardization.251  
These major organizational transformations were time consuming and expensive, 
but were designed to reinforce Eckert’s commitment to winning back the public’s trust. 
Eckert’s internal changes demonstrated diligence and genuine concern for both his 
employees and the public, yet stopped short of overreaction. Eckert’s tone and actions 
were “all credible indicators of competence and integrity, and all the more so for being 
proffered in the full knowledge of the punitive legal consequences.”252 In a 2012 analysis 
of the Mattel crisis, Dr. Graham Dietz, senior lecturer in human resource management 
and organizational behavior at Durham University in the United Kingdom, wrote, “No 
rival company [of Mattel] has accomplished this level of organizational reform.”253  
D. STRATEGY RESULTS 
Following the organizational changes and new procedures, Eckert received 
countless accolades, both internally and externally, for the way he personally took control 
of the crisis. Eckert’s organizational reform achievements were well received by his 
employees, Mattel’s stakeholders, and, more importantly, the public.254 In a nationwide 
survey, 75 percent of consumers felt Mattel did a good job responding to the crisis.255 In 
2008, Fortune contacted and interviewed Mattel employees based throughout North 
America, South America, Europe, and the Asia Pacific, and an overwhelming majority 
indicated management’s dedication to resolving the crisis made employees feel 
comfortable and engaged, which positively impacted employee morale.256 Moreover, the 
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company’s sincere and visible approach to the crisis earned them the praise of the media, 
while Congress applauded Mattel’s “laudable lack of corporate defensiveness.”257  
Most experts agree that, by the end 2008, Mattel had survived the crisis and 
created a stronger company directly attributed to organizational reform.258 By the 
beginning of 2008, despite paying over $110 million to mitigate the crisis, stock prices 
and net income rose to pre-crisis levels.259 By the time the 2008 holiday season ended, 
Mattel reported an annual revenue of $6.33 billion, up 4.5 percent from 2007.260 As a 
consequence, Fortune ranked Mattel one of its top 100 companies to work for in 2008, 
largely in part of Eckert’s response to the crisis, citing “over 1,000 employees have been 
with the company for over 15 years.”261 Additionally, IR Magazine awarded the 
company the Best Crisis Communication Award in 2008 for its handling of the recall 
crisis.  
As Mattel commemorates the ten-year anniversary of the 2007 crisis, despite the 
double-digit revenue and profit growth of Mattel’s biggest competitor, Lego, Mattel 
retains the top spot for worldwide toy industry sales in 2016.262 Moreover, the 
organizational transformations that Eckert pioneered have driven industry standardization 
development and participation, and have been approved and adopted by the International 
Organization for Standardization.263  
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The Mattel case proves that controlling a crisis and regaining consumer trust 
requires strong corporate communicators who can deliberately balance employee and 
public acceptance to organizational reform. The company recognized the crisis as an 
opportunity for creative change, and transformed a scenario in which millions of 
children’s lives were potentially at risk by nurturing meaningful organizational 
development.  
Eckert, who is seen by some experts as a transformational leader, used the recall 
crisis to create positive outcomes for Mattel by establishing “strong internally-controlled 
responses to what otherwise might be considered to be [a] negative crisis event.”264 
Eckert is also proof that when a crisis strikes, particularly with little or no warning, strong 
leadership and courage is needed to successfully manage and resolve the crisis.265 
For discussion purposes, it is important to introduce the notion of responding to a 
crisis by doing nothing, or by attempting meaningless reform. There are infinite examples 
of organizations that have responded to a crisis in this manner. It is here that this thesis 
differentiates the manager from the transformational leader. The major difference 
between the two is that a manager responds to a crisis by controlling resources, 
reinforcing procedures and routines, and focusing on pre-established goals and 
objectives.266 A transformational leader, however, achieves those results by 
communicating and coordinating change with employees of an organization, and 
implements crisis planning paradigms that benefit stakeholders, employees, and the 
public.267 A transformational leader understands that the manager who responds to a 
crisis by doing nothing or implementing ineffective reform can cause devastating 
consequences for the organization, possibly even leading to its dissolution. 
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Organizational reform like Mattel was able to accomplish is often difficult, and is 
frequently the source of anxiety for an organization. Harvard Business Review authors 
John Kotter and Leonard Schlesinger contest the largest hurdles for organizational 
change include employee resistance, parochial self-interest, opposing understandings, 
lack of trust, and low tolerance for change.268 However, the authors also contend these 
hurdles are not insurmountable, even in the midst of a crisis, if an organization sees the 
crisis as an opportunity for change.269 Successful organizational reform during a crisis, as 
illustrated by the Mattel case, is often characterized by the skillful application of 
communication, education, participation, and support by a leader who is determined to 
help the company emerge from the crisis a stronger, more trustworthy organization. 
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VI. HOW “NO COMMENT” CAN SHAPE THE NARRATIVE 
During a crisis, the media, particularly traditional media reporters, can be 
relentless. Whether the discussion is a low-key, one-on-one interview, or the interviewee 
is surrounded by reporters with microphones, simply stating “no comment” can be the 
most damning answer to any question. The “no comment” response, even when given in 
good faith, is particularly damaging because it implies guilt, lack of concern, or simply 
incompetence.270 Therefore, it is often crucial for executives and crisis communicators to 
realize that “no comment” is indeed a comment, and often one that can have a detrimental 
impact on the organization’s reputation.  
An organization’s refusal to comment allows customers, clients, or, more 
critically, the media to shape the crisis narrative for an organization.271 When left without 
a comment from organizational leadership, the media will infer or create the message for 
its readers, often with troublesome results. Public relations crisis management expert 
Gerry McCusker takes this a step further and asserts that a slow comment to a crisis is the 
“next worst thing to no comment.”272 During a crisis, the public will undoubtedly 
demand a comment underscored with accountability, and a narrative will ultimately take 
shape, whether or not the organization is willing to take part in shaping that narrative. 
Reputation management experts agree that crafting an informative message in an era 
when the public demands instant communication, even when information is unavailable 
or non-disclosable, focuses on mitigating any damage to the company’s reputation and 
can proactively aid in defusing the crisis.273 
Law enforcement is all too familiar with the “no comment” response to the media 
during a crisis. General and special counsel to law enforcement agencies will often stress 
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there are times when it is not only appropriate, but legally necessary to say “no 
comment.”274 However, public relations professional Jocelyn Broder cautions crisis 
communicators to refrain from commenting only when organizational executives are 
legally bound to “no comment.”275 It is also important to concede that law enforcement 
attorneys are not concerned with reputation management during a crisis, and the “no 
comment” approach should never be used as the default crutch.276 On the contrary, when 
exploited, a thoughtful message delivered to the public through the media will provide 
law enforcement the opportunity to shape the narrative, and possibly even advance law 
enforcement’s objectives.   
This chapter analyzes a case study in which an organization failed to shape the 
crisis narrative, allowing organizational silence to become the story, and the resulting 
impact on the organization’s reputation. 
A. INTRODUCTION TO THE CASE 
In 1962, the first Target store opened in the Minneapolis suburb of Roseville, 
Minnesota.277 Formerly the Dayton Hudson Corporation, the company’s “principal 
operating strategy was to provide exceptional value to American consumers through 
multiple retail formats ranging from upscale discount and moderate-priced to full-service 
departments.”278 Although the company owned three major retail divisions including 
Target, Mervyn’s, and Marshall Field’s, the Target brand distinguished itself by offering 
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upscale products at widely affordable prices.279 The corporation successfully began 
expanding its stores nationwide in the 1980s; by 1987, revenue hit $10 billion.280  
As of 2017, Target operated 1,816 stores and thirty-nine distribution centers in the 
United States, “making it the nation’s second largest discount store retailer, second only 
to WalMart.”281 The company’s 2016 annual financial report indicated it made $73.8 
billion in revenue, equating to $19.5 billion in gross income.282 Target was listed number 
thirty-eight on the 2016 Fortune 500 list, primarily because of a strategic pivot to focus 
more on kids’ items, health and wellness, and fashion.283 
In addition to being the nation’s second largest discount retailer, Target’s business 
model incorporated social responsibility to capture the trust and loyalty of consumers. 
The company “has committed to donating $2 million each week to the communities in 
which stores are located.”284 Additionally, the corporation partners with Feeding 
America in its “Target Meals for Minds” program to bring food to K-12 children in 
need.285 As a final example, in 2015, Target raised and donated $1 billion to the nation’s 
education system in the form of books, supplies, food, and educational field trips.286  
Consequently, from 2009 to 2012, the company consistently ranked within the top 
100 on Forbes’ “Most Ethical Companies” list, “America’s Top Companies” list, and the 
“World’s Most Valuable Brands” list.287 
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However, Target’s reputation came under intense debate during the winter months 
of 2013, when “criminal hackers gained access to [approximately] 40 million customer 
credit cards.”288 In addition to the credit cards affected by the breach, it was estimated 
that nearly 60 million more people had their personal information accessed, with the 
cyber breach affecting nearly 100 million people.289 Although a cyber data breach and 
subsequent fallout is arguably the worst crisis any company could endure in today’s 
cyber-intensive environment, the worst of the crisis was not Target falling victim to a 
cyber attack, but the organization’s inadequate response to the public, or lack thereof, as 
a result of that attack.  
It should be noted that Target knew about the November 27, 2013, security breach 
before the story was made public. According to statements from company executives 
during the subsequent investigation, Target’s headquarters was notified of potentially 
malicious activity involving personal data on November 30, 2013, but decided not to take 
immediate action.290 Prior to Target releasing any information regarding the security 
breach, blogger Brian Krebs publicly reported on December 13, 2013, that Target was 
investigating “a security breach involving millions of records,” and that the company was 
“hiding the bad news from vulnerable customers.”291 Furthermore, it was also leaked that 
Target discreetly hired a forensic investigator and notified the United States Department 
of Justice prior to making any public comments.292  
According to multiple media sources, “Target failed to respond to multiple 
requests for comment.”293 It was not until December 19, 2013—six days after the 
security breach was made public and twenty-two days after Target executives were aware 
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of the cyber attack—that the company confirmed approximately 40 million credit cards 
were compromised.294 The company waited another month before individually notifying 
affected customers, a move compliance and ethics experts say was “a little too late to 
assuage fears and regain trust.”295 
To make matters worse for executives, Target provided misinformation on 
multiple occasions when it finally made public comments. Initially, the company 
announced the cyber breach only affected customers who were active from Thanksgiving 
through December 6, 2013.296 This information, however, was incorrect; Target 
eventually extended the point-of-sale activity window to December 15, 2013.297 
Moreover, the company initially announced 40 million credit cards were 
compromised.298 However, in January 2014, executives publicly announced the breach 
was “far worse than previously projected,” and an additional 70 million people had their 
names, addresses, phone numbers, and email addresses stolen.299  
Ultimately, Target had to revise its damage assessment and public comments 
twice following its initial announcement.300 The company has yet to publicly disclose 
precisely how the cyber attack and data breach occurred.301 
Although Target was the victim of the largest cyber attack and data breach in 
history, very few sources painted the company as a victim.302 On the contrary, Target, 
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particularly immediately following the breach, appeared to be a nationwide retail giant 
that lacked both responsiveness and empathy for its customers. The silent approach did 
not work well for executives, and by the time the slow drip-drip of information release 
commenced, “the combination of new and old media metastasize[d] into a self-feeding 
system of toxic attention beyond the [company’s] reach.”303 In the public’s eyes, Target 
effectively allowed itself to morph from victim of a cyber crime to criminal co-
conspirator.   
B. PROBLEMS FACED FOLLOWING THE CRISIS 
Almost overnight, Target’s profits plummeted to new lows. During a quarter of 
the year when sales are historically at their highest point because of the holiday season, 
the company reported a 46-percent drop in sales compared to the previous year.304 
Diminishing returns continued into the first quarter of 2014 when Target reported a 16-
percent decline in post-holiday sales.305 Shareholders also reacted negatively to the 
breach; shares plummeted nearly 13 percent in just one month of the breach.306  
Customers, angry as a result of the lack of immediate response, lashed out at the 
company on social media, specifically citing “the perpetual busy signal on the company’s 
customer service hotline.”307 When asked to comment on the security breach and how it 
affected consumers, Hemu Nigam, CEO of security consulting company SSP Blue, 
stated, “I think they’ve already lost the trust of many individuals.”308 This statement was 
supported by an Associated Press poll, which revealed half of Americans were concerned 
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about shopping at Target stores, with an additional 61 percent indicating they were 
“deeply concerned” with shopping at Target online.309  
Unfortunately, the breach did not just affect the company externally; internal 
organizational structure was also sent into disarray. Marking the first time in U.S. history 
a chief information officer resigned following a data breach, Beth Jacob left the 
company, stating, “This was a time for significant transformation for ... Target.”310 Just 
two months later, the company’s board of directors pressured CEO Gregg Steinhafel, a 
35-year veteran of the company, to resign.311 Before departing, however, Steinhafel 
announced “the layoff of 475 employees and the elimination of 700 vacant positions as it 
struggled with sluggish sales following the data breach crisis.”312 Within just one month 
of the layoffs, Target executives began noticing a decline in employee morale and 
productivity.313  
In 2015, it was estimated that gross expenses stemming from the data breach cost 
Target upwards of “$252 million, with insurance covering approximately $90 
million.”314 The company subsequently announced it devoted $100 million to updating 
security technology in hopes to prevent a similar attack from occurring.315 In 2017, the 
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company resolved the nationwide case in civil court by agreeing “to pay $18.5 million to 
settle claims filed by 47 states and the District of Columbia.”316  
C. REPUTATION AND CRISIS STRATEGY 
In previous chapters, this thesis analyzed crisis and reputation management 
strategies employed by organizations to recapture consumers’ trust. However, much 
institutional and reputational analysis has been devoted to Target’s failed attempts to 
maneuver through one of the nation’s largest data-breach crises. This section of the 
chapter, therefore, details what the organization failed to do to maintain public trust and 
legitimacy. Target’s reputation management failure can be broken down into three major 
actions, or inactions:  
• Target failed to “break the story” publicly, allowing the media, sprinkled 
with customer fear, to shape the crisis narrative.  
• Once the company publicly commented on the data breach, executives 
failed to disclose the full extent of the breach, and released misinformation 
on more than one occasion.  
• Target failed to acknowledge it could have done more to prevent the 
breach, and has yet to sincerely convey or convince the general public a 
similar attack could not happen. Even the company’s FAQ web page does 
not apologize for the mishap, and has been criticized by ethics experts as 
existing “to keep panicky customers from clogging phone lines” as 
opposed to assisting those impacted by the breach.317 
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D. ANALYSIS 
Target’s data breach has become a rich lesson in crisis and reputation 
management; the longer an organization waits to publicly comment on a crisis, the more 
time the public and the media has to frame the crisis narrative, often with inaccuracies 
that neither exonerates nor bolsters the organization’s reputation.318 According to Forbes, 
although Target did some things right during the data breach crisis, the company “made 
some classic mistakes that have not only compromised their reputation, but the trust of 
their customers, [their] employees, and the public.”319 After all, the data breach, which 
could happen to any company in this cyber age, was not really the result of the 
organization’s wrongdoing. Target’s guilt was a byproduct of its inadequate handling of 
the crisis.  
To be fair, Target may not have had the information required to release a well-
informed, thoughtful statement when it was forced to respond to the news of the data 
breach on December 19, 2013. Additionally, experts close to the organization often 
counsel leaders to “limit their statements, and their liability, and encourage the 
organization to withhold information from the public until the magnitude of the crisis can 
be fully understood.”320 However, analysis of Target’s mishandling of the breach by 
crisis and reputation management experts clearly indicates the company underestimated 
the crisis; while Target remained silent in order to limit liability and understand the 
breach more clearly, a small-time blogger leaked the story and singlehandedly 
jeopardized the organization's reputation with its customers, employees, stakeholders, 
and the public.321  
Forbes contributor Davia Temin framed it most succinctly when she stated, 
“Target leadership’s biggest flaw may have been to listen to the wrong experts: they 
stayed silent when they should have broken the story themselves and over-
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communicated. They minimized when they should have maximized. They obfuscated 
when they should have leveled with their customers. And they made false assurances that 
they later needed to retract. Now, fewer will believe them when they speak.”322 
This thesis suggests the lessons from the Target case are three-fold:  
1. Organizational leaders, when faced with a crisis that directly impacts the 
public, should not wait to go public with information. As suggested by the 
Target case, leaders do not need to have all of the information; it is more 
important to announce what the organization does and does not know, and 
make clear the organization’s intentions to resolve the crisis. Then, more 
importantly, leadership’s promises must be kept. The organization’s 
reputation could potentially take a hit, but if words are supported by 
actions, the organization’s credibility will not. Ultimately, this will help 
preserve the public’s trust.  
2. Organizations should not let others shape the crisis narrative. The Internet 
has become a crisis narrative designer. While some experts suggest that it 
is still a legitimate strategy to wait until a crisis has been fully investigated 
before going public, those same experts agree that the Internet may not be 
so patient.323  
3. Organizations should disclose the full known extent of the crisis. “While 
calls for immediate and full disclosure may often be unrealistic, 
information leaks regarding crises are now the rule, not the exception.”324 
Small inaccurate nuggets of information that require constant correction 
only further incapacitate an organization’s ability to mitigate the crisis by 
allowing critics and second-guessers to disparage the organization across 
multiple media platforms.   
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Analysts at Forrester Research assert that “although breach costs are on a 
downward trend,” Target will most likely suffer financial and intangible costs associated 
with the crisis for years to come.325 It is hard to determine whether the company’s 
consumer-trust index would have remained the same, if its profits would have dipped, or 
if its executives would still be employed had Target responded to the data breach 
differently. However, by most assessments, Target, at the very least, would have avoided 
being heralded as a reputation case study of what not to do during a crisis.326 
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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS: A WAY FORWARD FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
The crisis management discipline is deeply aware of the value of reputation.327 
After all, reputation is said to be a company’s most valuable intangible asset, and a crisis 
is often the unpredictable event that threatens to damage that reputation.328 An 
organization’s reputation is developed and refined through a combination of interacting 
factors, such as “first-hand interactions with the organization, mediated reports about the 
organization” (i.e., traditional media, social media, and advertising), and “second-hand 
information” (i.e., word of mouth and personal blogs).329 Ultimately, reputations are 
largely established by how the organization treats, or responds to, consumers, the public, 
and various stakeholders.330  
This thesis asserts that, as an industry, law enforcement is currently experiencing 
a nationwide crisis. The shootings of unarmed individuals, particularly African 
Americans, the inadequate response by some law enforcement executives, and the 
subsequent civil unrest raise highly disturbing and often volatile concerns for public 
safety. Just like the private companies and executives who experienced the crises 
highlighted in this thesis, law enforcement agencies and their leaders have an obligation 
to the communities they serve to honestly assess and reevaluate how they respond to 
crises. 
Outside of tactical operations and emergency management, very little academic 
work has been dedicated to crisis and reputation management in law enforcement. 
Presumably, this is because law enforcement limits its definition of crisis to “a great 
calamity or disaster that law enforcement is called to mitigate and restore order.”331 Very 
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few, if any, law enforcement executives are willing to suggest a crisis can be caused by 
the industry’s actions or inactions.  
For example, the Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century 
Policing, a United States Department of Justice publication that is arguably law 
enforcement’s handbook for modern-day policing, mentions the word “crisis” twenty-
eight times.332 However, not once does it describe the tension between law enforcement 
and several communities across the nation as a bona fide crisis. Furthermore, during the 
2016 International Association of Chiefs of Police conference, top law enforcement 
executive and then-FBI Director James Comey spoke about the challenges facing current-
day law enforcement.333 During his twenty-minute speech, Director Comey asserted that 
the nation is facing “a uniquely difficult time in American law enforcement,” suggesting 
the executives in the audience were “experiencing the hardest time in [their] careers.”334 
Although Director Comey was correct in stating law enforcement officers are confronted 
with unparalleled challenges, not once did he use the word “crisis” to describe law 
enforcement’s current state of affairs.335 Indisputably, there are a number of issues and 
concerns relevant to law enforcement, with very little agreement on the cause of those 
issues and concerns. However, every reader of this thesis, regardless of occupation or 
trade, can agree that the media images and videos of civil unrest throughout the country 
depict law enforcement experiencing a monumental crisis.  
This thesis provides an opportunity for law enforcement executives to learn from 
the private sector, and to put the most critical lessons in crisis and reputation management 
into practice. By heeding the lessons highlighted in previous chapters, law enforcement 
executives have the chance to evaluate their strengths and vulnerabilities and address 
potential crises long before public anger boils over and erupts into civil disturbance. If a 
law enforcement executive is open to evaluating the need for the strategies advocated in 
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this thesis, and conduct a realistic assessment of the organization’s current crisis and 
reputation performance markers, a new skillset of tactics designed to deliver proper 
response and effective containment of even the most unyielding crises will emerge.  
The remainder of this chapter is a synthesis of the strategies presented in this 
thesis, and ultimately provides law enforcement executives with a crisis and reputation 
management template, or a new way forward, for crises. It is essential for law 
enforcement executives to understand that the question is not, “Will we join the ranks of 
BP, Volkswagen, Mattel, and Target?”; the question is undoubtedly, “When will we join 
them?” How a law enforcement department responds to its crisis—meaning how the 
department manages the welfare of its employees, vocal critics, and the public—will be 
directly aligned with the organization’s reputation.  
A. CRISIS COMMUNICATION VIA SOCIAL MEDIA 
At nearly every annual International Association of Chiefs of Police conference, 
there is inevitably a speaker or workshop that encourages law enforcement executives to 
leverage social media to instill public confidence. The overarching message is that law 
enforcement must embrace social media as a communication tool and can no longer 
afford to ignore it, despite preferred methods of communication with the public.336 With 
heads nodding, executives pat themselves on the back for success stories such as the 
Boston Police Department’s use of social media to engage and galvanize citizens 
following the Boston Marathon bombing.337  
However, that is not the type of crisis or communication technique this thesis set 
out to probe. While 92 percent of law enforcement agencies across the nation use some 
form of social media to supplement their operations and investigations, 84 percent of the 
public indicates it is only minimally informed about the operations and decisions of its 
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police departments.338 This highlights a major chasm between the public’s expectations 
and law enforcement’s use of social media as a communication tool. Add in a major crisis 
such as an officer-involved shooting or incident of officer misconduct, and crisis 
communication via social media is nearly nonexistent. Very few instances can be 
identified in which a law enforcement executive exploited social media as a means to 
communicate with the mass public during the immediate onset of a crisis. Most, if not all, 
waited for traditional media to gather for one large press conference.  
As an example, on July 17, 2016, three police officers were shot and killed by a 
sniper in Baton Rouge, Louisiana.339 During the shooting, “one person was broadcasting 
the event on Facebook Live while another eyewitness was live on Periscope. [In 
contrast,] it was five and a half hours before a news conference was held. Meanwhile, 
social media posts from the affected police agencies were weak and sporadic, as were any 
attempts to post statements to their official websites.”340  
As suggested in this thesis, the faster an organization leverages social media as a 
crisis communication tool, the less potential impact there will be to the organization’s 
pre-established reputation, and the faster the organization can focus on rebuilding trust 
with the public and stakeholders. Do law enforcement executives need to have all the 
answers or be willing to discuss non-disclosable information? Absolutely not; in fact, this 
thesis discourages disclosure of inaccurate, incomplete, or legally prohibited information. 
However, making a prompt YouTube video, crafting a 140-character Tweet with accurate 
information, or creating an informative and honest Facebook message that has been 
approved by the leadership and legal teams could be the starting point to navigating a law 
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enforcement crisis. If 140 characters is not enough, rest assured there is reprieve; Twitter 
has explored the possibility of doubling its maximum limit to 280 characters.341 
Most law enforcement executives understand there is no legal or professional 
requirement to limit communication with the public to traditional media. Incorporating 
timely two-way social media communication as a collaborative tool during a crisis “can 
act as a fast and effective way to communicate with [the public] ... as many individuals 
now use various social media conduits as their primary means for getting 
information.”342  
It is important to stress that law enforcement executives cannot simply stop after 
one video or post. “The multiple channels, user-level control of messaging, and real-time 
delivery makes social media far more complex than [one-time] press releases and 
conferences.”343 The level of consistency and frequency with which an executive 
communicates on social media “during and post-crisis can determine the damage done to 
[the organization’s] brand.”344 Maintaining constant and proactive communication on 
social media will set the tone for the crisis while simultaneously building confidence and 
trust with the organization’s employees, its stakeholders, and the public.   
When deciding whether to use social media as a mass communication tool during 
a crisis, consider these facts: in 2015, there were 1.06 billion active Facebook users, 
1 billion active YouTube users, 500 million Twitter users, and 12.6 million Vimeo 
users.345 By 2017, 81 percent of the United States population had a social media profile, 
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representing a 5-percent increase from 2016.346 According to experts, that figure will 
only continue to grow as more and more people become engaged with social media.347 
B. TRANSPARENCY 
Transparency has become a buzzword in law enforcement. A growing number of 
police departments capitalize on the concept for their vision or mission statements, and it 
is even one of the underlying tenets in the Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 
21st Century Policing.348 However, there is no established method to measure 
transparency, and each police department, theoretically, has a different perspective on 
what transparency means. Furthermore, a recent study conducted by San Diego State 
University Professor Joshua Chanin suggests police departments across the nation do not 
meet public expectations for transparency.349 
One thing is for certain: politicians, civil rights groups, the general public, and 
even some law enforcement executives are calling for increased transparency from law 
enforcement.350 Across the country, body-worn cameras have become synonymous with 
transparency.351 In 2014, as a means to increase transparency and fortify the trust 
between communities and the police, the Obama administration proposed a three-year, 
$263 million initiative that will, in part, increase the number of law enforcement agencies 
that equip their officers with body-worn cameras and enhance training for officers.352 
The federal initiative, aptly named that Body-Worn Camera Pilot Partnership Program, 
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promised a fifty–fifty match for local and state law enforcement agencies willing to 
purchase body-worn cameras and the requisite storage space.353   
At the beginning of 2016, nearly 95 percent of all large police departments either 
implemented, or committed to implement, a body-worn camera program.354 In order to 
assess their effectiveness, a nationwide study conducted in Rialto, California, indicated 
that use-of-force incidents and citizen complaints against officers decreased by 
50 percent and 90 percent, respectively, when agencies outfitted their officers with body-
worn cameras.355 Once again, law enforcement executives across the nation patted 
themselves on the back as they claimed equipping their officers with this new technology 
would meet public expectations for transparency.  
This thesis contends, however, that—although body-worn cameras are reshaping 
the public’s perception of law enforcement—police departments across the nation are 
rolling out these devices without adequate answers to the public’s questions about camera 
footage and its release. It has been three years since the Obama administration announced 
the Body-Worn Camera Pilot Partnership Program, and there remains a host of 
unanswered concerns: How will the footage be used? Who has access to the footage? 
Should law enforcement agencies release the footage to the public? And if so, are there 
privacy rights that need to be addressed before releasing the contents? There is therefore 
little empirical evidence to suggest body-worn cameras have increased transparency or 
improved accountability.    
According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, “Body-worn cameras 
continue to be a significant focus for state lawmakers as they consider and enact 
legislation to address police-community relations.”356 As of the beginning of 2017, 
30 states, and the District of Columbia have created laws that govern body-worn 
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cameras.357 Although there are a number of agencies across the nation—including the 
New York Police Department, Oakland Police Department, San Francisco Police 
Department, and most recently the Los Angeles Police Department—that have, or 
announced they will begin releasing, body-worn camera footage as a means to respond to 
the public’s plea for increased transparency, an overwhelming majority of police agencies 
refuse to release body-worn camera footage.358 In fact, nineteen of the thirty states with 
body-worn camera laws on their books enacted legislation specifically restricting public 
access to body-worn camera footage without a court order, with dozens more proposing 
legislation.359 
The Trump administration has made it clear that the release of law enforcement 
footage will lie squarely at the discretion of state legislatures, law enforcement 
executives, and state and city officials.360 When asked about its stance on the release of 
body-worn camera footage, the Trump administration responded, “Law enforcement 
agencies that will be using body-worn cameras will do so with the proper balance 
between good management and protection of privacy.”361  
This thesis asserts that routinely releasing body-worn and dashboard camera 
footage of a police pursuit, officer-involved shooting, or other crimes captured by the 
devices, in conjunction with a candid yet empathetic message, would provide for greater 
transparency and increased accountability, and potentially overcome ambiguities 
common in community–police debates. As the case study analyzed in this thesis suggests, 
when a crisis emerges, swift and controlled communication conveyed with transparency 
and honesty during the initial hours and days of the crisis is critical to preserving an 
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organization’s reputation. Therefore, law enforcement departments will ultimately benefit 
from making footage, and the departmental policies that govern the devices, routinely 
available to the public. If law enforcement wants to avoid appearing as if it is 
intentionally suppressing evidence, releasing body-worn and dashboard camera footage 
will “build upon efforts to mend the fabric of trust, respect, and common purpose that all 
communities need to thrive.”362 
It is important for law enforcement executives to appreciate that the media can, 
and will, obtain dashboard or body-worn camera footage from their agencies through 
public pressure, a public records request, or a court order.363 It is the reason why there 
are countless law enforcement videos currently available on the Internet; the associated 
narrative, however, is nearly always that the department intentionally withheld footage 
from the public.364 And while countless jurisdictions have attempted to restrict public 
access to officer-involved shootings, there are no federal or state laws that preclude an 
agency from releasing the video when information deemed confidential or private has 
been redacted. If the proliferation of body-worn cameras was designed to “provide 
greater transparency and police accountability,” as declared by the Obama and Trump 
administrations, it is time to reevaluate the assertion that age-old resistance should 
supersede transparency and the public’s right to know.  
C. ORGANIZATIONAL REFORM 
As noted in the case study, strong communicators who can deliberately balance 
employee and public acceptance to organizational reform can help control a crisis and 
regain consumer trust. Being able to view a crisis as an opportunity and driving force for 
change often means the difference between an organizational manager and an 
organizational leader. With so many communities calling for reform in law enforcement, 
are law enforcement agencies reluctant to change? If they are willing to change, is it 
meaningful reform that is communicated and, more importantly, enforced from the 
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executive level down to the patrol officer? Harvard Business Review contributor and law 
professor at the University of Virginia School of Law Barbara Armacost argues that the 
law enforcement profession is resistant to organizational change and “the only effective 
mechanism for addressing police [perception] is top-down, systematic reform of the 
police organization itself.”365 
If the nationwide data presented in this thesis is correct—showing that there has 
been an increase in police shootings of unarmed individuals followed by an increase in 
public backlash and retaliatory attacks on officers—it would behoove law enforcement 
executives to identify solutions and opportunities for change. According to Geoffrey 
Alpert, a law enforcement expert and professor of criminology, “We know what needs to 
happen next but we just keep studying the question instead of doing something about the 
answers we’ve arrived at.”366 
This thesis supports a systematic, standardized approach to organizational reform 
in law enforcement as a means to improve public trust on a nationwide level. Moreover, 
it suggests avoiding ineffective reform in one area of law enforcement in favor of 
purposeful reform in multiple areas of the discipline. These areas include introducing 
innovative training for officers, improving data collection (and making that data available 
to the public), creating a culture of officer accountability, and increasing the diversity of 
police departments.     
As one example, police departments need to focus on innovative de-escalation 
and crisis intervention training in an effort “to reduce the lethality of interactions between 
police and the community.”367 De-escalation training encourages “officers to slow down, 
create space, and use communication techniques to diffuse potentially dangerous 
situations.”368 Although the theory behind the training sounds beneficial and necessary, a 
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2017 American Public Media report indicated that only thirteen of the fifty U.S. states 
mandate de-escalation training for law enforcement officers.369 Moreover, many local 
police and sheriff departments indicate their agencies do not require the training, “citing, 
among other reasons, cost, lack of staff, and a belief that the training is unnecessary or 
constitutes a rebuke of traditional policing.”370 Without a nationwide requirement, or a 
uniform standard between local jurisdictions within states, inconsistency fuels mistrust in 
police. 
Although it can be argued there are no scientific studies indicating de-escalation 
training unequivocally results in a decrease in officer-involved shootings, several police 
departments that have implemented the training, including those under federal consent 
decree, have reported lower incidents of use of force.371 For example, the Dallas Police 
Department, arguably one of the more innovative departments under the leadership of 
Chief David O. Brown, reported an 18-percent decrease in use-of-force incidents and, an 
83-percent drop in excessive force complaints, just one year after mandating de-
escalation training for all officers.372 With this dataset in mind, can law enforcement 
afford to not mandate de-escalation and crisis intervention training for its employees, 
regardless of the cost and time commitments?  
Another way to enhance organizational reform, underscored by transparency, is to 
create a data collection repository that is readily available to the public. For the purposes 
of this thesis, included in that collection and disclosure are the department’s established 
policing policies, something most agencies and the governments that oversee them are 
reluctant to make public.373 Collecting data and making it available to the public not only 
provides accountability for the agency and its officers, but encourages “joint problem 
solving, innovation, [and] enhanced understanding between communities and the law 
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enforcement agencies that serve them.”374 Providing data regarding police policies and 
police–community interactions allows law enforcement executives to combine 
transparency with an innovative approach to community policing and accountability, and 
ultimately creates a partnership with communities to improve public safety.  
The concept of making policing data publicly available, which is supported by the 
Final Report by the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, “is the key to 
increasing community trust and police accountability.”375 The data, which becomes a 
powerful tool for police–community relations, even allows executives to identify any 
potential discriminatory practices, and makes way for new and innovative policing 
solutions. Some of the suggested items to be collected and made public include, but are 
not limited to: 
• agency-written policies (un-disclosable information should be redacted, in 
consultation with the agency’s legal department); 
• age of person(s) contacted; 
• race and/or ethnicity of person(s) contacted; 
• sex and/or gender of person(s) contacted; 
• reason(s) for contact; 
• disposition of person(s) contacted; 
• use of force, if any; 
• arrest(s), if any; 
• searches, if any; and 
• death(s), if any.  
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The nation’s largest state police department, the California Highway Patrol, is 
currently collecting this data, compiling it, and creating a report to be given to the 
California State Legislature.376 The data is also being used by non-governmental 
organizations to establish best policing practices and policies.377 However, this data is 
not currently readily available nor easily accessible to the public.378 Furthermore, the 
California Highway Patrol does not make the agency’s written policies readily available 
to the public on its website.379  
This thesis asserts that law enforcement agencies, if governed by the right leaders, 
have the capacity to leverage organizational reform “for the purposes of enhancing trust, 
understanding, innovation, and the co-production of public safety.”380 When asked about 
organizational reform in law enforcement agencies across the nation, Noble Wray, former 
police chief and chief of policing practices and accountability for the federal Office of 
Community Oriented Policing Services, stated, “There are those departments that want to 
constantly improve and do the right thing. There are those departments that are just 
treading water. Then there are the departments that are flat out doing nothing. And at 
times, they end up being motivated by things like lawsuits and consent decrees.”381  
For the law enforcement executives reading this thesis, the importance of creating 
an organizational culture that accepts reform for the purposes of rebuilding and 
maintaining public trust cannot be underscored enough.     
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D. SHAPING THE NARRATIVE 
The most opportune time to comment on a crisis is before anyone else even 
knows about it. However, according to Forbes contributor Davia Temin, “Immediate 
response and indelible accountability [is] a tall order for any leader.”382 She further 
states, “If you do not speak for yourself quickly, or if you do so poorly, someone else—
antagonist ... competitor, or anonymous hater—will speak for you. And in the world of 
public perception, the first mover has the advantage.”383 In a climate where immediacy is 
not only key but expected, an organization’s ability to shape the crisis narrative can have 
a tremendous impact on the organization and its reputation.  
For decades, law enforcement has had the convenience of news cycles and next-
day interviews. It was standard practice to wait until the 6 o’clock news or put off an 
interview to design a well-choreographed response to the press or public following a 
crisis. Today, however, when a law enforcement executive fails to respond immediately, 
or responds with “no comment,” the media and the public are at liberty to generate a 
crisis narrative for the police, often built on incorrect information, misconception, and 
disparagement. As seen in today’s climate, this usually results in negative consequences 
for the agency’s reputation.   
As suggested by the Target case study, failing to shape the crisis narrative does 
not just negatively impact the organization’s relationship with the public; it could also 
have a potential impact between management and rank-and-file employees. According to 
Brian Willis, deputy executive director for the International Law Enforcement Educators 
and Trainers Association, “When the public hear [sic] no comment, they think the police 
did something wrong and are trying to cover it up—when the officers from the involved 
agency hear it, they feel angry and betrayed by their leader.”384 When leaders refuse to 
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inform or educate the public on officer actions, or inactions, officers are led to believe 
their leaders do not support, or have lost touch with, line-level employees.  
Reputation management corporation Temin and Company created a checklist for 
organizational leaders who want to remain focused on their organization’s reputation 
during a crisis.385 This checklist, found in Figure 1, can be applied by law enforcement 
executives experiencing a crisis in order to maintain, or repair, a robust reputation. 
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Figure 1.  Crisis Response Checklist386 
                                                 
386 Source: Temin, “15 Minutes.” 
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E. CONCLUSION 
Crises are an integral part of organizational life, and law enforcement is not 
immune to this predisposition.387 As noted by one expert, “If you are not now in a crisis, 
you are instead in a pre-crisis situation and should make immediate precautions for the 
crisis that looms on the horizon.”388 During an era when one officer-involved shooting 
has the capacity to disturb the smooth operations of an agency and permanently damage 
organizational reputation, law enforcement leaders should be prepared to successfully 
employ effective crisis and reputation strategies aimed at reestablishing public trust. The 
evidence presented nationwide indicates law enforcement crises have resulted in 
unprecedented problems that cannot be resolved with traditional strategies. New 
innovative and effectual crisis and reputation strategies, supported by academic rigor, 
could be the key to recovering the trust of the American public. 
As suggested previously in this thesis, reputation management and crisis 
management are not mutually exclusive. Crisis management experts are deeply aware of 
the value of reputation. Likewise, reputation management experts understand the 
importance of reputation during a crisis. Therefore, leaders and executives who wish to 
successfully manage a crisis must fully understand and appreciate their organization’s 
reputation pre- and post-crisis. Moreover, organization reputation “is both a factor and 
consequence of crisis management”; successful crisis management could lead to an 
improved reputation, while ineffectual crisis management could lead to a damaged 
reputation.389 It is therefore important for reputation-minded managers to realize that 
even small crises resulting from minor system failures can lead to catastrophic 
consequences for an organization’s reputation. 
The cases presented in this thesis suggest that the issue of reputation is directly 
linked to an organization’s trustworthiness, perceived legitimacy, effectiveness, and more 
importantly, success. This assertion can be extrapolated to the law enforcement industry. 
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According to the National Institute of Justice, a police force with a good reputation is not 
just simple rhetoric; a strong reputation creates a police–community partnership that 
enhances trust, equality, and public safety.390 This thesis also contends, however, that 
organizational reputation is often dismissed by the law enforcement profession. Many 
officers across the nation, frustrated with the growing disparity between law 
enforcement’s reputation and its stark reality, perform shallow self-assessments and push 
aside any reputation concerns, “regarding any external [value judgement] as onerous, 
unjust, and ideologically motivated.”391  
In response to the claim that law enforcement fails to recognize and appropriately 
employ crisis and reputation management strategies, this thesis presents an opportunity 
for law enforcement departments and the executives that lead them. Using existing 
research and case analysis on crisis and reputation management as a starting point, 
meaningful discourse for law enforcement emerges from lessons learned in the private 
sector. If the evidence is correct and reputation management, particularly during a crisis, 
is connected to an organization’s perceived trust and legitimacy, law enforcement can 
employ crisis and reputation management strategies to regain the American public’s trust.  
The benefit of effective crisis and reputation management strategies is not merely 
an academic inquiry; the results could have profound implications for the law 
enforcement profession by shifting the current public perception of the police. Although 
public perception of law enforcement is often a complex and sophisticated catechism, 
fraught with nuances and mixed perspectives, it is universally agreed that high levels of 
trust and confidence in police is essential for the promotion of safety in a contemporary 
democratic society. For law enforcement executives truly concerned with public safety, 
repairing and maintaining a favorable reputation or public image during and following a 
                                                 
390 Bertus R. Ferreira, “The Use and Effectiveness of Community Policing in a Democracy,” National 
Criminal Justice Reference Service, accessed October 20, 2017, www.ncjrs.gov/policing/use139.htm.  
391 Carlos Lozada, “What’s Wrong with America’s Police Forces? Absolutely Everything, or Nothing 




crisis will ultimately allow law enforcement to function more effectively and will provide 
a safer environment for the communities it serves. 
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